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The Unhappy History of Economic Rights
in the United States and Prospects for
Their Creation and Renewal
FRANK E.L. DEALE*
I. INTRODUCTION
Of the western industrialized nations,1 the United States is one of
the most reluctant to recognize any legal obligation to provide mini-
mum economic guarantees 2 to the poor.3  Some countries, including
* Associate Professor at the CUNY School of Law. I wish to express my thanks to the
following individuals for their assistance with earlier versions of this article: Ruth Lowenkron,
Bert Lockwood, Jr., Jules Lobel, David Kairys, Sharon Hom, Stephen Loffredo, Penny An-
drews, Dorothy Zellner, Deborah Zalesne, Euly Martinez, Timothy Scott Pfeifer, Sangita Shah,
and the folks at the Howard Law Journal. Special thanks to Peter Weiss at the Center for Con-
stitutional Rights for introducing me to these issues. Of course, I assume full responsibility for
the views expressed herein and none of the above are accountable for any misstatements or
errors.
1. See Ann Shola Orloff, The Political Origins of America's Belated Welfare State, in THE
POLITICS OF SOCIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 37 (Margaret Weir et al. eds., 1988) (noting
that compared with European countries that began to establish such provisions as early as 1883,
the U.S. had very few welfare provisions before the passage of the Social Security Act of 1935).
2. I use the phrases "economic rights," "minimum welfare provisions," and "minimum
welfare guarantees" interchangeably to describe the various economic, cultural, and social rights
defined in specific international instruments. These international conventions require signatory
state-parties to respect minimal welfare provisions such as an adequate standard of living, hous-
ing, health care, rights to employment, education, and participation in cultural life. See, e.g.,
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., at arts.
VI, VII, IX, XI, XII, XIII, XV (1966) [hereinafter International Covenant], reprinted in 6 I.L.M.
360 (1967), in CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF HUMAN RIGHrs, TWENTY-FIvE HUMAN RIGrrs Doc-
UMENTS 10 (1994).
3. I use the term "the poor" with a great deal of hesitation because of my great respect for,
and admiration of, the work of Frances Fox Piven and Richard A. Cloward and their essential
text, FRANCES Fox & RICHARD A. CLOWARD, REGULATING THE POOR: THE FUNCTIONS OF
PUBLIC WELFARE (1971). Although Piven and Cloward never provide an explicit definition of
this phrase, they do write of those "at the bottom of the economic order." Id. at xiv. I do not
refer to the static, identifiable, or visible segment of the population that is presently situated at
the bottom of the socio-economic ladder. Rather, I speak of "the poor" as an historic category
of those at the "bottom of the economic order," that exists in all contemporary societies and
expands and contracts depending on the strengths and weaknesses of political forces mobilized
to defend their interests. See generally David Piachaud, Down But Not Out: Why the Term "Un-
derclass" Is No Help in Understanding Social Ills, TIMES LIT. SuFP. (London), Jan. 24, 1997, at 3,
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the United States, have various statutory entitlements assuring mini-
mum welfare.4 Many countries, unlike the United States,5 have fed-
eral constitutional entitlements.6 Other than the United States,
almost all western industrialized countries are legally and politically
committed to minimum welfare guarantees.7
This federal reluctance to mandate constitutional guarantees of
minimum welfare exacerbates the economic inequality of the U.S. in-
come structure. Further, this inequality aggravates the long-standing
4 (noting that in Britain, approximately half of those who were in the bottom tenth of income
distribution in 1991, were above this level three years later).
In the contemporary U.S., it would be easy to proffer a head count of "the poor" by count-
ing the recipients of various forms of governmental largesse, supplemented with an estimation of
the homeless population. However, I also include those millions whose economic condition is so
insecure that the loss of employment, for however limited a time, will plunge them into the ranks
of "the poor."
In 1989, an estimated 56 million Americans, about one in four, lived in poverty. See Ste-
phen Loffredo, Poverty, Democracy and Constitutional Law, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1277, 1316 n.171
(1993) (citing JOHN E. SCHWARTZ & THOMAS VOLGY, THE FORGOTrEN AMERICANS 61-63
(1992)). Schwartz and Volgy claim that federal poverty guidelines greatly underestimate the
number of Americans who cannot afford basic necessities such as food, clothing and shelter.
They further estimate that "egregious aspects of inadequate nutrition, in terms of abject depriva-
tion, could be eliminated through an appropriation of less than 10 billion dollars, an amount
equal to a fraction of one percent of the federal budget for fiscal year 1993 and an even smaller
fraction of the gross national product." Id. at 1321. See also Peter Edelman, The Next Century
of Our Constitution: Rethinking Our Duty to the Poor, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 8-18 (1987).
4. For an overview of the various federal statutory entitlement programs and how they
function, see HELEN HERSHKOFF & STEPHEN LOFFREDO, ACLU GUIDE TO THE RIGHTS OF THE
POOR (1997).
5. In noting the dearth of explicit provisions protecting minimal welfare provisions in the
U.S. Constitution, I do not mean to downplay or counter arguments that such rights should be
teased out of its text. See, e.g., Frank Michelman, On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth
Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7 (1969).
6. One researcher concluded in 1987 that "[iun contrast to the United States, the constitu-
tions of over 30 nations guarantee their citizens an adequate standard of living, 62 national con-
stitutions specifically establish the right to welfare assistance or social security benefits, and 73
nations provide their people with a right to education." See Ann I. Park, Note, Human Rights
and Basic Needs: Using International Human Rights Norms to Inform Constitutional Interpreta-
tion, 34 UCLA L. REv. 1195, 1196 n.1 (1987) (citing H. VAN MAARSEVEEN & G. VAN DER
TANG, WRTEN CONsTrrUTIONS: A COMPUTERIZED COMPARATIVE STUDY 117-18 (1978)). See
also Mary A. Glendon, Rights in Twentieth Century Constitutions, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 519, 526-32
(1992).
For an illuminating discussion about the efforts to incorporate judicial socio-economic rights
in South Africa, see Craig Scott & Patrick Macklem, Constitutional Ropes of Sand or Justiciable
Guarantees? Social Rights in a New South African Constitution, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1992).
7. As of June 30, 1994, the International Covenant has been ratified by 129 countries. See
MATTHEW C.R. CRAVEN, THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON ECONOMIC, CULTURAL AND SO-
CIAL RIGHTS: A PERSPECTIVE ON is DEVELOPMENT app. III (1995). This number includes the
vast majority of western countries. Id. Only Liberia and the United States have signed but not
ratified the covenant. Id.
The United States commits a smaller portion of its national income to redistributive welfare
programs and tolerates more income inequality than other advanced industrial nations. See
Howard Oxley & John P. Martin, Controlling Government Spending and Deficits: Trends in the
1980s and Prospects for the 1990s, OECD ECONOMIC STUDIES, 14-189 (Autumn 1991).
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racial tensions and animosities that have plagued this country since its
foundation. We must examine our inability to implement constitu-
tional welfare rights in the context of the rich culture of justiciable
political and civil rights found in our national discourse and interna-
tional political practice.8
While the United States does not currently experience the pov-
erty known in other parts of the world,9 we are by no means immune
to its existence, which is compounded by its disproportionate racial
effects.' ° Although we have experienced a decrease in the percentage
of African Americans living below the federally defined poverty line,
many major cities contain poverty pockets where the percentage of
poor African American families increased from 30 to 50% between
1970 and 1990." Clearly, unless we take affirmative economic action,
the so-called "underclass"' 2 is in no danger of disappearing.
8. The United States has ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
("ICCPR") which recognizes rights similar to those guaranteed by the Bill of Rights and the
Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. See International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., at arts. VI-XXVII (1966), in
CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF HUMAN RIGHTS, TWENTY-FIVE HUMAN RIGHTS DOCUMENTS, supra
note 2, at 17, 18-23. Although the ICCPR has been declared non-self executing and requiring
enabling legislation before it can be enforced directly in the U.S. Courts, being a signatory has
allowed the U.S. to raise issues concerning political and civil rights more forcefully with other
countries as part of its foreign relations.
9. In a 1972 article, Ralph K. Winter noted, "black Harlem is one of the world's wealthiest
communities - fifth or so in per capita income of all communities outside of North America and
Europe. What is considered poverty in America is considered almost great wealth everywhere
else." Ralph K. Winter, Jr., Poverty, Economic Equality, and the Equal Protection Clause, 1972
SuP. CT. REV. 41, 80 (1972).
10. Even with the social, political and legal advances of the civil rights movement, the pro-
portion of African Americans to whites below the poverty line is approximately three to one, the
same as in 1959. While the number of poor African Americans has increased by 686,000 in thirty
years, the number of white poor has declined by 4 million. In 1992, 42.7% of all African Ameri-
can households earned less than $15,000, as compared to only 21.6% of white households. While
the average African American per capita income relative to white has risen slightly (from 53% in
1967 to 58% in 1992) the gap in average net worth per household is much greater. Whites enjoy
a three to one advantage. In 1967, 16% of African American households made more than
$35,000 dollars compared to 36.6% of white households. In 1992, 25.8% did so as compared to
46.6% of white households. See George M. Fredrickson, Land of Opportunity, in N.Y. REV. OF
BooKs, Apr. 4, 1996, at 4 (reviewing JENNIFER L. HOCHSCHILD, FACING UP TO THE AMERICAN
DREAM: RACE, CLASS, AND THE SOUL OF THE NATION (1995)).
11. See Andrew Hacker, Modest Proposals, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, Nov. 28, 1996, at 11 (re-
viewing WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, WHEN WORK DISAPPEARS: THE WORLD OF THE NEW URBAN
POOR (1996)).
12. The term "underclass" has been used to refer to "the most disadvantaged segments of
the urban black population who are outside the mainstream of American occupational systems,
primarily families from below the poverty level, recidivist criminals, second and third generation
welfare dependent persons and homeless persons." See Leonard Harris, Agency and the Concept
of the Underclass, in THE UNDERCLASS QUESTION 33-34 (Bill E. Lawson ed., 1992).
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Not only the inner city underclass is affected by income inequal-
ity and the fluctuations of the economy. Many young American fami-
lies of all races have experienced negligible income growth over the
past twenty-five years. Disturbingly, the income growth they have ex-
perienced has cost leisure and family time. 3 Young males trying to
raise families, buy homes, send children to college, and prepare for a
secure retirement are particularly affected. 4 The inability of many
middle income families to accomplish these goals, once heralded as
the "American Dream," has resulted in attacks on government, af-
firmative action, women's rights, immigrants, and the overall welfare
state.' 5
This article asserts that the continuing existence of poverty pock-
ets throughout the United States, coupled with economic stagnation
and financial insecurity for large numbers of working people, indicates
structural flaws in our society. These must be addressed by the human
and civil rights community with the same vigor with which that com-
munity has historically addressed political and civil rights.' 6
I propose that creating a culture more willing to provide mini-
mum welfare guarantees requires reassessment and supplementation
of the fundamental propositions which undergird the national and in-
ternational quest for human and civil rights. These propositions have
hitherto successfully facilitated the establishment of meaningful politi-
cal and civil rights in the United States. However, they have less suc-
13. See Louis Uchitelle, The American Middle, Just Getting By, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 1999, at
1; THEDA SKOCPOL & STANLEY B. GREENBERG, THE NEW MAJORITY" TOWARDS A POPULAR
PROGRESSIVE POLITICS 1, 7, 23, 24-26 (1998); Robert Reich, Clinton's Leap in the Dark: How the
Plight of the Next to Poor Has Distorted the Reform of Welfare, TIMES LIT. Supp. (London), Jan.
22, 1999, at 3, 4.
14. See Lester C. Thurow, The Boom That Wasn't, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 1999, at A17 (noting
that "median family incomes ... haven't risen since the early 1970s, yet the average wife is
working 15 more weeks a year than she did back then [and] [r]eal wages for 80 percent of the
male labor force are below where they used to be").
15. See SKOCPOL & GREENBERG, supra note 13, at 4, 56, 58.
16. Many will challenge this assertion, preferring to believe that urban poverty and eco-
nomic insecurity have always been, and always will be necessary ingredients of daily life in mod-
ern societies. Some would go further and argue that poverty and insecurity are necessary to
keep the engines of production moving. Noting the prevalence of this state of mind in the 17th
century, Lewis Mumford observed that:
[D]estitution had been accepted as the normal lot for a considerable part of the popula-
tion. Without the spur of poverty and famine, they could not be expected to work for
starvation wages. Misery at the bottom was the foundation for luxury at the top. As
much as a quarter of the urban population, it has been estimated, consisted of casuals
and beggars: it was this surplus that made for what was considered by classic capitalism
to be a healthy labor market, in which the capitalist hired labor on his own terms, or
dismissed workers at will, without notice, without bothering as to what happened to
either the worker or the city under such inhuman conditions.
LEWIS MUMFORD, THE CITY IN HISTORY 432-33 (1961).
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cessfully introduced into our national political culture the norms of
economic and social rights that have informed the international
human rights movement since the Second World War.
The first of these propositions holds that fundamental human
rights are most secure when established at the federal, as opposed to
the state or local level. This notion emerged during Reconstruction,' 7
and has endured through the Civil Rights era. In the 1950s and 1960s,
state and local authorities' failure to respond to localized racial vio-
lence frustrated African American efforts to secure political and civil
rights. 8 Absent coercive federal authority, state and local officials ig-
nored their primary legal obligations to enforce the Thirteenth, Four-
teenth, and Fifteenth Amendments, as well as the civil rights statutes
promulgated under their authority.
A corresponding proposition maintains that a counter-
majoritarian federal judiciary will ostensibly protect legal rights even
if these rights lack support from the politically representative
branches of government. This was demonstrated by the courageous
federal judges and lawyers who fought private and institutional racism
in the courts of the United States.'9
The third proposition rests on the same counter-majoritarian pre-
sumption as the preceding propositions. National and international
human rights should not be subject to the dictates of the popular polit-
ical process and are best safeguarded by federal constitutional guaran-
tees. Federal authorities must be relied upon to protect human rights
in spite of shifting political winds. In addition, we must develop a par-
allel system of international human rights guarantees which exceeds
17. See generally JAMES M. MCPHERSON, ORDEAL BY FIRE: THE CIVIL WAR AND RECON-
STRUCTION (1982); ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION
(1988); W.E.B. DuBois, BLACK RECONSTRUCTION IN AMERICA (1935); JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN,
RECONSTRUCTION AFTER THE CIVIL WAR (1961).
18. See generally MICHAEL R. BELKNAP, FEDERAL LAW AND SOUTHERN ORDER: RACIAL
VIOLENCE AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICT IN THE POST-BROWN SOUTH (2d ed. 1995); HER-
BERT SHAPIRO, WHITE VIOLENCE AND BLACK RESPONSE: FROM RECONSTRUCTION TO MONT-
GOMERY 370-73 (1988); HARVARD SrrKOFF, THE STRUGGLE FOR BLACK EQUALITY 90, 160-61,
164, 173, 213 (Rev. ed. 1993).
19. See, e.g., JACK GREENBERG, CRUSADERS IN THE COURTS: How A DEDICATED BAND OF
LAWYERS FOUGHT FOR THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION (1994); RICHARD KLUOER, SIMPLE JUS-
TICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION, THE EPOCHAL SUPREME COURT DE-
CISION THAT OUTLAWED SEGREGATION, AND OF BLACK AMERICA'S CENTURY LONG STRUGGLE
FOR EQUALITY (1975); J.W. PELTASON, FIFTY EIGHT LONELY MEN: SOUTHERN FEDERAL
JUDGES AND SCHOOL DESEGREGATION (1961). For histories of the use of the federal courts to
protect human rights outside of the area of racial justice, see SAMUEL WALKER, IN DEFENSE OF
AMERICAN LIBERTIES: A HISTORY OF THE ACLU (1990).
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the protective scope of federal and state law in the United States. 20
To the extent feasible, these international guarantees must be made
binding on federal and state authorities to ensure the human rights
ignored by federal authorities and to create rights where none have
existed before.2'
Over the years, human rights advocates have assumed the contin-
uing stability of these propositions in their efforts to secure economic
rights. They have, with varying degrees of success, argued for con-
gressional ratification of international treaties and engaged in eco-
nomic rights litigation.22 However, this paradigm has failed to yield a
culture of economic rights in the United States, as ironically demon-
strated by the United States' recognition of various international civil
and political rights compacts, while becoming a nation of glaring eco-
nomic inequalities.23
I believe we need to supplement the approaches outlined above.
In addition to addressing these issues primarily at the federal level, I
advocate intense local activity. I believe we must direct more effort
towards grassroots political activity, which addresses the more politi-
cally representative branches of government, instead of placing pri-
20. See generally Hurst Hannum, Human Rights, in THE UNITED NATIONS AND INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 131, 137-54 (Christopher C. Joyner ed., 1997).
21. Cf. Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal
Common Law: A Critique of the Modem Position, 110 HARV. L. REv. 815, 846-47, 868 (1997);
Howard Tolley Jr., Interest Group Litigation to Enforce Human Rights: Confronting Judicial Re-
straint, in WORLD JUSTICE? U.S. COURTS AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGrs 123-24 (Mark
Gibney ed., 1991).
22. See Philip Trimble, A Revisionist View of Customary International Law, 33 UCLA L.
REV. 665, 675-76 (1986); Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, The Current Illegitimacy of
International Human Rights Litigation, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 319 (1997); Bradley & Goldsmith,
supra note 21, at 841, 846; Lea Brilmayer, International Law in American Courts: A Modest
Proposal, 100 YALE L.J. 2277, 2309-12 (1991).
23. For example, the United States has recently passed welfare "reform" legislation that will
cut federal support for poor families by about $7 billion annually over the next five years. This
includes a $500 million cut in child nutrition programs at a time when one out of four or five live
below the poverty level. Martha Honey, Guns 'R' Us, IN THESE TIMES, Aug. 11, 1997, at 16,17;
Jeff Madrick, In the Shadows of Prosperity, N.Y. REv. OF BOOKS, Aug. 14, 1997, at 40, 41 (re-
viewing ANDREW HACKER, MONEY: WHO HAS HOW MUCH AND WHY (1997)). This type of
legislation has been denounced as "[some] of the most regressive legislation passed by any devel-
oped society since World War II." See Letter to the Editor from Robert Bellah, Professor of
Sociology at the University of California, Berkeley, in N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, Nov. 28, 1996, at 65.
The congressional decision to end Aid to Families With Dependent Children ("AFDC") was the
first time a section of the Social Security Act was repealed. This fairly indicates the distance
American society has come since passage of the Act. But see Reich, supra note 13, at 3 (sugges-
tion by former Secretary of Labor that the original intent was to "smooth the passage from
welfare to work with guaranteed health care, child care, job training, and a job paying enough to
live on" but was changed because Clinton "feared he could not justify a reform that would, in
fact, cost more than the welfare system it was intended to replace").
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mary reliance on the federal judiciary for creative textual
constructions of the Constitution. I propose that local activists use
extant international guarantees as aspirational guideposts to define
the nature of economic, cultural and social rights. More importantly,
our demands for these rights must become more legally and politically
substantive. These include constitutional conventions, ballot initia-
tives, and organized grassroots demands for selected economic rights
such as housing, health care, education, jobs, welfare, or whatever best
suits the geo-political environment.2 4
Any economic rights theory must recognize the United States as
a highly developed capitalist economy, with governmentally regulated
"free markets."25 Our demand economy has historically increased
productivity, provided consumers with a wide variety of consumer
items, and enabled many people to lead lives that allow them mean-
ingful opportunities to exercise their talents. Recent economic indica-
tors show that not only are unemployment rates lower than they have
been in several years, but that they are well below that of other west-
ern democracies.2 6 However, these positive economic indicators have
disguised pervasive middle class income stagnation over a twenty-year
period. This has caused the middle class to demand substantial reduc-
tions in both taxes and government spending on programs designed to
provide minimum welfare guarantees.2 7 As a consequence, the mid-
dle class is torn between its desire to participate fully in a booming yet
24. Cf. Louis Henkin, International Human Rights and Rights in the United States, in
HUMAN RIGrrs IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 49 (Theodore Meron ed., 1984) (criticizing heavy reli-
ance on courts and suggesting the need for legislative planning and spending in creation of eco-
nomic and social rights); Margaret Weir and Marshall Ganz, Reconnecting People and Politics, in
SKOCPOL & GREENBERG, supra note 13, at 149, 151 ("[T]o succeed, a new progressive politics
must be grounded in organized citizenry rooted in specific communities and at the same time
linked together in larger networks with the capacity to deliberate about, develop and carry out
local, state, and national strategies."); Karen M. Paget, The Battle for the States, in id. at 172, 191-
94 (highlighting necessity to engage in state level political struggles for social welfare
guarantees).
25. See CHARLES E. LINDBLOOM, POLmCS AND MARKETS: THE WORLD'S POLmCAL-Eco-
NOMIC SYSTEMS 108 (1977).
26. In November 1997, Spain had an unemployment rate of 21%; France, 13%; Germany,
11%; Britain, 6%. See Martin Walker, Is Europe's Market Up to the Job?, MANCHESTER
GUARDIAN WEEKLY, Nov. 23, 1997, at 6. In May of 1998, the U.S. unemployment rate was
4.3%, the lowest in three decades. See Sylvia Nasar, US Jobless Rate Plunges to 4.3%, Lowest
Since 1970, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 1998, at Al. For a critique of the U.S. numbers, see Edward S.
Herman, The U.S. Job Miracle: Not the Model It's Touted to Be, Z MAGAZINE, July-Aug. 1998, at
62, 63.
27. See Louis Uchitelle, Flat Wages Seen as Issue in '96 Vote: Only the Wealthy Can Claim
Gains, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 1995, at 26 (noting Republican strategy to end economic stagnation
and balance the budget by eliminating federally financed job training, tax incentives for educa-
tion, head start programs, and subsidized student loans).
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precarious economy, and its sporadic recognition of the need to sup-
port itself and the less fortunate through federal social programs.
28
The future of minimum welfare guarantees will therefore largely turn
on how this segment of the population perceives its responsibility.
I begin my analysis with a survey of how the urban indigent were
treated prior to ratification of the Constitution. Municipal welfare
guarantees began with early American variations of Elizabethan Poor
Laws.29 These local supports laid the foundation for extensive state
constitutional provisions governing minimum welfare provisions,
which by and large remain in effect today.3" In the period prior to
ratification of the Constitution, state legislatures protected the inter-
ests of those who argued that the Constitution would create a wealthy
class of aristocrats and industrialists. They feared that this new class
would seek to mobilize wealth for themselves and depoliticize local
struggles for economic protection by preventing states from providing
minimum welfare provisions. After ratification, only in times of acute
national crisis such as the Civil War, Reconstruction, and the Great
Depression, has the federal government assumed responsibility for an-
ything resembling economic rights, or minimum welfare guarantees.
Indeed, President Johnson's "Great Society" was perhaps triggered by
urban rebellions in the ghettos of America's major cities. Although
constitutional and international scholars have long argued for mini-
mum federal welfare guarantees, absent fundamental national crises,
minimum welfare guarantees have been relegated to the battleground
of state politics.
28. Only 14% of Americans oppose the welfare system because "it costs too much tax
money." Sixty-five percent of respondents stated that the worst thing about welfare is that it
"encourages people to adopt the wrong lifestyle and values." Eighty-five percent said that they
would be satisfied with the welfare system if recipients "were required to do something in ex-
change for their benefits, even if just raking leaves or cleaning roads." See The Zero Hour, IN
THESE TIMES, May 13, 1996, at 6.
29. See Larry Cata Backer, Medieval Poor Law in Twentieth Century America: Looking
Back Towards a General Theory of Modern American Poor Relief, 44 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 871,
997, 1032, 1040 (1995); William P. Quigley, Five Hundred Years of English Poor Laws, 1349-
1834: Regulating the Working and Nonworking Poor, 30 AKRON L. REV. 73, 74, 100 (1996);
WALTER I. TRATINER, FROM POOR LAW TO WELFARE STATE: A HISTORY OF SOCIAL WELFARE
IN AMERICA 16 (6th ed. 1999). -
30. Poor Relief and economic rights are not the same thing. As Larry Cata Backer has
argued, the poor relief "static" paradigm which still governs most welfare analysis "accepts the
social and economic order as a given - poor law programs do not challenge the status quo." See
Backer, supra note 29, at 886.
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II. POOR LAWS IN THE COLONIAL ERA
A. Municipalities
Compared to England, colonial America did not have large con-
centrations of "deserving" poor. The poor in the colonies never
reached more than 10% of the total population, whereas in England
the percentage of people regularly, or at least occasionally, dependent
on public charity at times reached as much as 50% of the total popula-
tion.3" Only one-fifth of the English population owned land compared
to two-thirds of the white colonial population. The remaining third
who did not were mostly recent immigrants and young men awaiting
their inheritance or an opportunity to move and acquire property.32
Of course, ownership of property was limited to white males and
the privileges of being white increased substantially following the vio-
lent dispossession of Native Americans.33 In 1619, African Americans
first entered the colonies largely as indentured servants. As late as
1651, small numbers of African Americans were assigned land upon
the completion of their servitude. However, many African Americans
found themselves bondservants for life in the 1640s. By 1661, Virginia
began passing legislation creating slaves for life, a practice soon fol-
lowed by the other colonies.34
Thereafter, freedmen could be found throughout the slave south
and in seaboard cities, where they sometimes found employment.35
Others, still enslaved, sometimes received meager pay for working as
slaves.36 In states such as South Carolina, slave owners were man-
dated by law to provide their slaves with food and care. Failure to
31. See GORDON WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 122, 171-72
(1992); Richard Morris, The Emergence of American Labor, in A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN
WORKER 7, 20 (1983).
32. More than 60% of the population owned no property. WOOD, supra note 31, at 122-23.
33. Morris, supra note 31, at 25.
34. JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN & ALFRED A. MOSS, JR., FROM SLAVERY TO FREEDOM: A HIS-
TORY OF AFRICAN AMERICANS 56-57, 58-67 (7th ed. 1994).
35. See LEON F. LITWACK, NORTH OF SLAVERY 154 (1961); IRA BERLIN, SLAVES WITHOUT
MASTERS: THE FREE NEGRO IN THE ANTEBELLUM SOUTH 60 (1974); GARY B. NASH, FORGING
FREEDOM: THE FORMATION Of PHILADELPHIA'S BLACK COMMUNITY 1720-1840 78-79 (1988);
Gary Nash, Forging Freedom: The Emancipation Experience in the Northern Seaport Cities, in
SLAVERY AND FREEDOM IN THE AGE OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 3, 8-10, 16, 18-19 (Ira
Berlin & Ronald Hoffman eds., 1983); Ira Berlin & Philip D. Morgan, Introduction: Labor and
the Shaping of Slave Life in the Americas, in CULTURE AND CULTIVATION: LABOR AND THE
SHAPING OF SLAVE LIFE IN THE AMERICAS 1, 19 (Ira Berlin & Philip D. Morgan eds., 1993).
36. See S. Sydney Bradford, The Negro Ironworker in Antebellum Virginia, 25 J. oF S. HIST.




meet these legal obligations led to stiff fines that were used to benefit
poor whites living in the area.37 To lessen this burden, slaveowners
often trained their slaves and rented out their labor. This practice was
especially prominent in Charleston, South Carolina, where African
Americans made up almost 40% of the overall population. Here,
slaves competed with white workers and dominated certain trades. As
a result, hiring out slaves became a profitable business for slave
owners.38
The overall strength of the colonial American economy did not
mean that all whites lived in relative affluence. Poverty was not un-
known to white colonial America and became manifest in different
times to different degrees: sometimes reaching crisis proportions,
sometimes receding to less overwhelming levels.39 Unemployment
was relatively uncommon, and the average job paid a living wage.4"
Nonetheless, pockets of poverty existed all along the eastern sea-
board.4 In response, local authorities developed means of support.
By the 1850s, New England had a significant number of tran-
sients. This situation transgressed upon the "culture of paternal de-
pendency," a system under which everyone belonged somewhere.42
In this "culture," those who stayed in town for three or four months
were seen as members of the community. The community then as-
sumed responsibility for their welfare. Disruption of this "culture" led
to the development of "settlement laws," designed to divide those en-
titled to community assistance from those not so entitled. These laws
established qualifications for residence, and instructed municipalities
on enforcement procedures so that the available relief would be given
to needy residents rather than the outsiders.43 These laws made local
authorities responsible for the poor.
37. A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., IN THE MATTER OF COLOR: RACE & THE AMEIJCAN
LEGAL PROCESS: THE COLONIAL PERIOD 192, 196 (1978).
38. PETER H. WOOD, BLACK MAJORITY: NEGROES IN COLONIAL SOUTH CAROLINA FROM
1670 THROUGH THE STONO REBELLION 205 (1974).
39. See generally GARY B. NASH, RACE, CLASS, AND POLITICS: ESSAYS ON AMERICAN CO-
LONIAL AND REVOLUTIONARY SOCIETY 173 (1986).
40. GARY B. NASH, ARTISANS AND POLITICS IN EIGHTEENTH CENTURY PHILADELPHIA 243,
245 (1986).
41. In Deadham, Massachusetts "the lowest fifth of the society at Deadham lived in 'scrab-
bling inadequacy,' where one man in ten had as assets little more than his strong back." See
KENNETH LOCKERIDGE, A NEW ENGLAND TowN: THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS 151 (1970).
42. WOOD, supra note 31, at 130.
43. A number of different approaches were used to enforce the settlement laws. In 1809,
New Hampshire towns would support paupers not technically settled, but would then bring suit
against the "town of settlement" to recover its costs. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY
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Localities and private donors provided subsistence assistance to
the indigent." However, compared to other municipal expenditures,
the sums were not significant.45 Colonial attempts to care for the indi-
gent were limited and devoid of extensive investigation or elaborate
procedures.46 Families were responsible for their members. How-
ever, the elderly, the disabled, and the widowed were boarded in
neighboring households; a practitioner provided medical care at pub-
lic expense.47
Settlement laws were buttressed by "warning out,"4 8 which ab-
solved the community of responsibility for those who could not claim
residency.49 "Warning out" also had roots in community fears and
mistrust,50 and was used to confront those who could potentially dis-
rupt the safety and security of the community.51 The numbers of per-
sons "warned out" increased notably in the 1750s, and included
disabled veterans, the post-war jobless, and those without property.
The public workhouse movement emerged in England in 1723.
Common at the time was the belief that those who did not work
should not eat.52 Once a workhouse was established in a particular
town, thousands of impoverished persons were taken off relief and
made to work. Like prison with hard labor, the workhouse was de-
signed to punish the deviant, incarcerate the dependent, and aid en-
OF AMERICAN LAW 215 (2d ed. 1985) (noting that decades of litigation made the law of settle-
ment one of the most "intricate" areas of colonial jurisprudence).
44. DAVID A. ROTHMAN, THE DISCOVERY OF THE ASYLUM 31 (1971). The leading provid-
ers of private donations were charities, including church groups such as the Quakers and
Presbyterians. Id.
45. During the 1760s, of Boston's 15,000 residents, the almshouse helped an average of 250
annually; at least three times as many residents not living in the almshouse received some assis-
tance. Id. at 6.
46. Id. at 31.
47. Id.
48. "Warning out" originated during the King Philip's War of 1675. It was designed to
discourage needy war refugees from coming to Boston. See NASH, supra note 39, at 173, 185.
49. TRAT-TNER, supra note 29, at 19, 21-22. Even though some towns warned out almost
every new arrival, Lawrence Friedman notes that warning out was not banishment, but a dis-
claimer of responsibility. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 43, at 90. See also THOMAS BENTON,
WARNING OUT IN NEW ENGLAND 16 (1911); STEPHEN FOSTER, THEIR SOLITARY WAY: THE
PURITAN SOCIAL ETHIC IN THE FIRST CENTURY OF SETTLEMENT IN NEW ENGLAND 141 (1971).
50. FRIEDMAN, supra note 43, at 217.
51. BENTON, supra note 49, at 46; FOSTER, supra note 49, at 141 (noting the passage of
ordinances forbidding residents to entertain strangers without permission, and requiring bond of
prospective inhabitants). In Philadelphia and Boston, there were large increases in those
"warned out" during and after the Seven Years War from 1756-1763.
52. As expressed by Cotton Mather, "for those that Indulge themselves in Idleness, the
Express Command of God unto us, is That you should Let them Starve." See id. at 119, 121
(quoting COT-rON MATHER, DURABLE RICHES (1695)).
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forcement of settlement laws. The threat of incarceration at hard
labor was thought to discourage poor beggars from entering the com-
munity.53 Notably, workhouses were uncommon in the colonies and
compared with England, Americans spent very little on them.54
The almshouse, on the other hand, was not just another name for
the workhouse. Its task was to lodge, feed, and perhaps employ those
in need. It was instituted to mitigate the costs of providing relief by
eliminating direct costs for housing. Following Boston's lead, Phila-
delphia and New York resorted to the use of almshouses, where the
poor were boarded at public expense beginning in the 1730s.11 The
few towns that maintained almshouses used them only as a last resort.
B. Urban Areas
1. Philadelphia
Excepting a 1720s depression, Philadelphia's fortunes grew stead-
ily from 1681 to the late 1750s.5 6 As in most colonial cities, the poor
consisted primarily of the elderly, the disabled, veterans, and immi-
grants. Between 1750 and the Revolution, major economic and social
dislocation in urban areas occurred. Large numbers of Americans en-
tered the revolutionary era without property, opportunity, or the abil-
ity to obtain the necessities of life without public aid. During this
period, the number of inhabitants admitted to the Philadelphia alms-
house, housing only forty residents shortly after being built in 1732,
increased by more than 900 persons.57 In response to increased ex-
penditures in 1763, Philadelphia transported poor migrants out of the
city.58 During the 1760s, Philadelphia's poverty rate was five percent,
a fivefold increase in one generation.59 In addition, the numbers of
taxpayers described in tax records as "insolvent," "poor," "runaway,"
or simply "no estate" increased to one in ten.6 °
In response, the city maintained a system of "out-relief," funded
through taxes, which allowed the poor to remain in their homes.
However, in 1767 a number of Quaker merchants dismantled the
"out-relief" system and replaced it with a "bettering house," where
53. ROTHMAN, supra note 44, at 25.
54. Id. at 25, 30-31.
55. See NASH, supra note 39, at 173, 214.
56. See id. at 214, 245.
57. See id. at 214-15.
58. Id. at 206 n.42.
59. Id. at 184.
60. Id. at 188.
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the poor would be confined. This was expected to be cheaper and to
teach better work habits to the poor. This approach was greatly re-
sented by the poor because it implied that their poverty was the result
of their own moral failure.6'
2. New York
In 1683, New York passed legislation directing local officials "to
make provision for the maintenance and support of the poor, 62 which
was supplemented in 1788 by further legislation requiring that
"[e]very city and town shall support and maintain their own poor."
63
The earliest record of provisions made for New York's poor shows
thirty-five people receiving aid; almost all either orphaned, elderly, or
disabled. 64 However, in 1702 a yellow fever epidemic killed 10% of
New York's population. As a result, there was a 62% increase in per
capita expenditure on the poor between 1698 and 1713. A household
census taken shortly after the epidemic revealed that 17.5% of all
families in the town were headed by single women, a chief factor in
New York's decision to double the amount of aid to the poor.65 A
1713 census found sixteen poor persons, including two children, one
soldier's wife and two adult males. Throughout that year, twenty peo-
ple were aided by the churchwardens. By 1714 the number increased
to twenty-eight.
The first almshouse in New York was built in 1736, providing re-
lief to approximately forty people.66 By the early 1760s, the popula-
tion of New York had increased by half while the poverty rate had
increased more than fourfold.67 In January 1765, the churchwardens
informed the common council that the monies raised for relief of the
indigent "have long since been expended," and that the problems of
the poor had reached the point where "unless more money was made
available immediately, the impoverished must unavoidably perish" for
want of food and firewood.68 Before the revolution, New York spent
three times the amount that it spent in the 1740s for poor relief. The
61. Id. at 256.
62. See GARY B. NASH, THE URBAN CRUCIBLE: SOCIAL CHANGE, POLITICAL CONSCIOUS-
NESS AND THE ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 21 (1979).
63. FRIEDMAN, supra note 43, at 213.
64. NASH, supra note 62, at 71.
65. Id. at 72.
66. NASH, supra note 39, at 181.
67. Id. at 183, 214.
68. NASH, supra note 40, at 254.
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cost of poor relief was "one of the largest items on the town
budget."69 These increases took place even though churches and
charitable organizations increased their donations.7 °
3. Boston
As early as 1700, Boston officials created work relief programs
for the poor, allowing them to earn income in facilities provided and
supervised by public authorities. However, by the 1740s, Boston was
no longer able to provide enough work for those who sought it. 71 In
1749, using private money, the first workhouse was built in one of the
largest buildings in the city.72 However, the number of occupants
never exceeded fifty because the Boston poor, mostly widows with
young children, refused to be taken from their homes. 73 During the
1740s, about 100 persons annually had no choice but to enter the Bos-
ton almshouse.7 4
Beginning in the late 1730s and peaking in the 1750s, Boston wit-
nessed substantial increases in poverty. 75 A threefold increase in ex-
penditures for the poor took place between 1729 and 1737.76 In 1753,
the town petitioned the legislature for assistance because poor relief
had risen to "over 10,000 pounds a year... besides private charity. '77
In 1752, during a period of high unemployment and economic depres-
sion, the Boston overseers of the poor reported that relief was double
that of any town of similar size "upon the face of the whole earth. 78
The cost of caring for the poor was reduced through the creation
of larger almshouses and workhouses, and by phasing out the costly
relief system. 79 In 1734, the almshouse held eighty-eight persons and
by 1742 the number had risen to 110.80 In the third quarter of the
century, the number of poor in Boston continued to rise. Within one
generation, the rate of poverty had climbed from about nine per thou-
sand to between twenty-seven and thirty-six per thousand. In some
69. NASH, supra note 39, at 181; ROTHMAN, supra note 44, at 320 n.10.
70. NASH, supra note 39, at 181.
71. Id. at 121.
72. Id. at 122.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 181.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 173.
79. Id. at 181.
80. Id. at 183.
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wards, the number of households receiving out-relief reached 15% be-
tween the years of 1769 and 1772, a percentage considerably higher
than that of Philadelphia or New York.8' In order to prevent these
numbers from getting larger, Boston "warned out" those who sought
to come into the city.
82
Although the population of Boston remained at about 16,000
from 1735 to the Revolution, the number of adult families capable of
paying taxes declined from a high of more than 3,600 in 1735, to a low
of about 2,400 around mid-century. The loss of more than a thousand
taxpayers indicated the declining fortunes of more than one thousand
householders - almost one third of the city's taxpaying population.83
Town officials were convinced that the decrease in the number of
adults able to pay taxes was caused by an increase in the number of
people who had fallen to the subsistence level or below.' On the eve
of the revolution, poverty in Boston had grown to encompass approxi-
mately one-fifth of the population.85
4. Virginia
Virginia, along with England and the other colonies, assumed re-
sponsibility for the care of those physically unable to support them-
selves, including large numbers of the wandering poor.8 6 In 1723, the
legislature empowered courts to return vagrants from whence they
came or force them to work. If servant labor could not be found, they
were punished with thirty-nine lashes.87 Some argued that poverty
could be limited by increasing the servant wages or lowering the price
of food. However, these ideas were rejected by those who felt that
workers only work when hungry and that higher wages or cheaper
food would only result in more time lost in drunkenness.88 This dis-
course suggests that government officials were less concerned with
81. Id. at 185.
82. Id. at 186.
83. Id. at 187.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 195. See also Jesse Lemisch, The American Revolution from the Bottom Up, in
TOWARDS A NEW PAST: DISSENTING ESSAYS IN AMERICAN HISTORY (Barton J. Bernstein ed.,
1969) (citing evidence of a "propertyless proletariat" comprising 14% of adult males in 1687 and
29% in 1771).
86. EDMUND S. MORGAN, AMERICAN SLAVERY FREEDOM: THE ORDEAL OF COLONIAL
VIRGINIA 237, 341 (1975).
87. Id. at 339.
88. Id. at 323.
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eliminating poverty than disciplining the poor, and various steps were
taken which ensured that the numbers of poor would not diminish.89
In 1668, Virginia created county workhouses modeled after those
in England. The workhouses took "poor children from indigent par-
ents to place them at work in the workhouses," a move that may have
been motivated less by the spread of poverty than the need for la-
bor.9" This accomplished two purposes: it put children into a work
force that was desperately short of labor, and it reduced indigent par-
ents' child rearing responsibilities, thereby forcing them back into the
ranks of servants. 91
The Virginia poor were also used to staff military expeditions.92
In 1736 they guarded the Georgia frontier, and in 1741 hundreds of
the poor were recruited as part of the English expedition against Car-
tagena in the West Indies. Indeed, in 1754, George Washington began
his military career attacking the French in the Ohio valley leading
"those loose idle and persons that are quite destitute of house and
home. '9 3 However, as the eighteenth century wore on, Virginia's
poor and lower classes benefited from growth in the world tobacco
market. The very rich in Virginia provided benefits to the poor to
assure that all whites remained aligned against African Americans.94
C. Summary
Clearly, urban poverty was a constant presence in colonial
America. It increased significantly in each of the large colonial cities
in the period leading up to the Revolution and the drafting of the
Constitution.95 In addition to the gradual increases in poverty there
was intense stratification as the cities grew larger and more commer-
cialized. 96 By the time of the Revolution, many urban areas had de-
veloped clearly defined classes of the genuinely wealthy and the
genuinely impoverished, 97 and the responsibility for caring for the
poor was a local responsibility.
89. Id. at 324.
90. Id. at 327.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 340.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 343-46.
95. See ALLAN KULIKOFF, TOBACCO AND SLAVES: THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOUTHERN CUL-
TURES IN THE CHESAPEAKE, 1680-1800 297-99 (1986).
96. See Morris, supra note 31, at 26.
97. NASH, supra note 39, at 174; TRATnrNER, supra note 29, at 32.
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III. ECONOMIC RIGHTS AND THE FRAMING
OF THE CONSTITUTION
As a result of the American Revolution, the United States took
the first step towards establishing a regime of federal protection for
human rights. The Revolution was fought for the right of national
self-determination, which was later enshrined in international human
rights instruments.98 This right was expressed by federal provisions99
that counteracted the states' and Great Britain's ability to act contrary
to the right. 100
National self-determination did not affect state and local govern-
mental responsibility for the poor,'0 1 because the Articles of Confed-
eration underscored the powers of the states as opposed to those of
the federal government. Pursuant to the Articles, the federal govern-
ment consisted of a simple one house legislature made up of state rep-
resentatives, each of whom had one vote.0 2 Although there were
some limitations on the powers of the states,0 3 the federal govern-
ment was provided with very few affirmative powers. The federal
government had neither taxing nor commerce powers, nor was there
provision for the creation of an Executive or Judicial branch of gov-
ernment. Instead, executive responsibilities were delegated to a Com-
mittee of the States,' and disputes were to be resolved by ad hoc,
temporary courts.
This extremely "state-centered"'1 5 document was explicitly de-
signed to preserve the sovereignty of the states.'06 Moreover, it as-
98. See, e.g., U.N. CHARTER arts. 1, 2, 55 in CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF HUMAN RIGHTS,
TWENTY-FIVE HUMAN RIGHTS DOCUMENTS, supra note 2, at 1, 2.
99. See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. I (formally establishing the "United States of
America"); U.S. CONST. preamble.
100. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (articulating reasons for terminating colo-
nial relationship with Great Britain); ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION (prohibiting states from
entering into agreements with foreign or domestic states without the consent of the United
States).
101. TRATNER, supra note 29, at 41.
102. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, art. V.
103. For example, the states were prohibited from engaging in foreign affairs, maintaining
armies in excess of those authorized by the federal government, and waging war without the
approval of the United States, unless invaded. See id. at art. VI. The United States was author-
ized, inter alia, to engage in foreign relations, maintain an army and wage war, and resolve dis-
putes between states. See id. at art. IX.
104. Id. at arts. IX, X.
105. I borrow this phrase from BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 105
(1991).
106. See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, art. II ("Each state retains its sovereignty, freedom,
and independence, and every power, jurisdiction and right, which is not by this Confederation
expressly delegated to the United States Congress assembled.").
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sured that the people of one state would be entitled to all the
privileges of the people of the other states, unless one was unfortunate
enough to be either a slave, a fugitive from justice, a vagabond, or a
pauper.10 7
That poor whites were disenfranchised along with slaves and
criminals in our foundational constitutional document should not sur-
prise us. Despite local responsibility for the poor, there prevailed dur-
ing this era a strong ideology that public out-relief or private charity
for widows and their children was money "worse than lost.' 0 8 Many
believed that poverty and the threat of starvation were the only incen-
tives to get common people to work. Operating on the assumption
that people only worked out of necessity, and that "freedom" was pri-
marily the "freedom from labor," ' 9 it was deemed indisputable that
the less money one had, the harder one would work."10 Even influen-
tial members of the clergy believed poverty had social benefits, and
saw it as a God-given opportunity for people to do good."' These
views informed the framers of the Constitution as they began their
meetings in Philadelphia." 2
In 1913, Charles Beard put forth his infamous economic interpre-
tation of the Constitution.1 3 Beard maintained that the Constitution
was written, designed, and implemented by financial interests who
were adversely affected by the structure of the Articles of Confedera-
tion. According to Beard's interpretation, the framers were an elite
group representing moneyed commercial interests, who acted without
popular authorization and contrary to the established means of
amending the Articles of Confederation. They put together a system
of government "based upon the concept that fundamental private
rights of property are anterior to government and morally beyond the
reach of popular majorities.""' 4 Pursuant to Beard's thesis, the Con-
stitution was then ratified by a group consisting of no more than one-
sixth of the adult male population. The line of cleavage "was between
107. Id. at art. IV.
108. See NASH, supra note 39, at 132.
109. See WooD, supra note 31, at 34.
110. Id. at 136.
111. Boston clergyperson Samuel Cooper believed that helping the needy was the highest
Christian virtue. See ROTHMAN, supra note 44, at 7.
112. WooD, supra note 31, at 136.
113. See CHARLES BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION (1986).
114. Id. at 324.
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substantial personalty interests on one hand and small farming and
debtor interests on the other.""' 5
Predictably, Beard's book unleashed a storm of controversy.
Presidents Taft and Harding denounced the book, and it was banned
in Seattle, Washington. Nicholas Murray Butler, President of Colum-
bia University where Beard taught, practically declared it obscene." 6
However, historians have respectfully debated Beard's work. The
thesis has confounded the traditional left-right divide, with some con-
servatives expressing agreement, and some leftists expressing criti-
cism.17 That there was a relationship between an individual's socio-
economic position and political behavior at the Constitutional Con-
vention, is generally undisputed. 118 In the words of Gordon Wood,
one of the leading historians of the era, "the constitution was intrinsi-
cally an aristocratic document designed to check the democratic ten-
dencies of the period.""319
Beard was not the first writer to argue that various elites in
American society approached the Constitution motivated primarily by
economic self-interest. His observations are consistent with those
members of the Constitutional Convention who sought to secure the
ownership and protection of property for themselves and others. 2 °
The articulated rationale for placing such protection at the center of
government affairs was the notion that possession of property pro-
vided a means for protecting individuals from government authoritari-
anism.121  Consequently, many of the states at the time of the
Constitutional Convention restricted the right to vote to those who
owned real property. 22  Additionally, James Madison, Alexander
Hamilton and John Marshall asserted that one of the key reasons for
115. Id. at 324-25.
116. See THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, 200 YEARS OF ANTI-FEDERALIST, ABOLITION-
IST, FEMINIST, MUCKRAKING, PROGRESSIVE, AND ESPECIALLY SOCIALIST CRITICISM 4 (Bertell
Ollman and Jonathan Birnbaum eds., 1990).
117. See Herbert Aptheker, On the Bicentennial of the Constitution: A Marxist View, in id. at
247, 248, 250 (noting agreement with the Beard thesis by "eminent conservative" historian John
W. Burgess, but asserting that the Beard thesis is "partial," "onesided," and "oversimplified").
118. See RICHARD BEEMAN, BEYOND CONFEDERATION: ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION
AND NATIONAL IDENTITY 14 (Richard Beeman et al. eds., 1987).
119. See GORDON WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787 513
(1998).
120. Both the Constitutional Convention and a large majority of white 18th century Ameri-
cans viewed the protection of property rights as the primary role of government. See Forrest
McDonald, The Constitution and Hamiltonian Capitalism, in How CAPITALISTIC IS THE CONSTI-
TUTION 49 (Robert A. Goldwith & William A. Schambra eds., 1982).




calling a constitutional convention was to protect economic liberties
violated by the states under the Articles of Confederation. The Con-
vention successfully accomplished this goal.123
Under these circumstances, it is problematic to cite the Constitu-
tional Convention of 1787 as the genesis of federal guarantees of mini-
mum economic welfare. 124  Because of their class background, it
seems unlikely that Convention members would argue for such provi-
sions.125  Further, the !proposed governmental framework was de-
signed to make it difficult to establish national economic and social
rights by imposing restraints on the exercise of state and national
power.'26 The new Constitution made it difficult to enact national so-
lutions for national problems because the states' police power was
limited to public health, safety, morals and welfare. 127
The new Constitution was, in many respects, a product of differ-
ent class orientations toward the poor. In general, the Federalists
were concerned with the threat that the poor posed to the rich, and
fought for provisions that would perpetuate the control of the wealthy
over those without property. 128 The Anti-Federalists, on the other
hand, demanded a society in which there would be "no extremes of
wealth, influence, education or anything else."'1 29  They sought a
model of government that would come as close to direct democracy as
possible. In this model, each citizen would feel a direct responsibility
123. Id. at 113.
124. See Stark, Economic Rights in the United States and International Human Rights Law:
Toward an "Entirely New Strategy", 44 HASTINGS L.J. 94 (1992) ("The framers of the Constitu-
tion never intended the federal government to assume the public welfare obligations of the
states.").
125. See Gary J. Kornblith & John M. Murrin, The Making and Unmaking of an American
Ruling Class, in BEYOND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: EXPLORATIONS IN THE HISTORY OF
AMERICAN RADICALISM 27, 54 (Alfred F. Young ed., 1993).
126. Morton Keller, Power and Rights: Two Centuries of American Constitutionalism, in
DAVID THELAN, THE CONSTITUTION AND AMERICAN LIFE 15, 26 (1988).
127. Id. at 27.
128. See JENNIFER NIDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN CONSTI-
TUTIONALISM: THE MADISONIAN FRAMEWORK AND ITS LEGACY 93-94, 142-49 (1990) (citing
Richard Morris' view that there was no way to eliminate the poverty of a whole group in society
or even of bringing about a means of more just distribution without "infringing on the rights of
property and thus undermining both the economy and the republic"); Jennifer Nidelsky, Confin-
ing Democratic Politics: Anti-Federalists, Federalists, and the Constitution, 96 HARV. L. REV. 340,
347 n.25, 348 (1982) (arguing that the Federalists believed in the public good, "but they had faith
in only the elite's capacity to define and pursue it," and noting the Federalists' assumption that
inequality of wealth is inevitable and that one of the essential conditions of prosperity is prevent-
ing the poor from ruining the economy and undermining the republic by trying to expropriate
the property of the rich).
129. Nidelsky, supra note 128, at 344 (citing 1 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 20 (Her-
bert J. Storing ed., 1980)).
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for, and an attachment to the government.13 ° The Anti-Federalist vi-
sion was frustrated by the creation of a structure which ultimately un-
dermined participatory democracy by removing basic issues from
popular understanding and control."'
What motivated the Federalists to so restrain state power in the
economic arena? Joyce Appleby notes that many state constitutions
drafted in the wake of the Declaration of Independence concentrated
governmental power in state legislatures, and these democratic bodies
were filled with ordinary men elected by ordinary voters. 132 These
legislatures took action on controversies over land grants, electoral
districts, and tax policies in ways that were sympathetic to large popu-
lar majorities in over half of the states. The interests of the elites were
disregarded. In western state legislatures, farm representatives fought
for increased access to land and the establishment of land banks.
They also postponed the elimination of public debt until more per-
sonal financial security had been achieved.'33 The price of necessities
such as bread were set by regulation, as were rates for inns, taverns,
and ferrymen. Laws regulated marketing practices, required inspec-
tion of many goods, and prohibited, taxed, or gave bounties to the
movement of others and established the allowable interest rate on
loans. Some legislatures also exercised rights to interfere in buying,
selling, and lending, even after deals had been transacted 34 Wealthy
individuals suffered particularly during the Revolutionary War. State
governments confiscated nearly $100 million of property without just
compensation or due process. This was almost half the value of real
property in the country.135
The Ex Post Facto, Bill of Attainder, and Contract clauses of the
Constitution were designed by the framers to limit the exercise of the
states' traditional police powers. 136 Although the Federalist Papers
critiqued the Articles of Confederation's structural weaknesses, state
legislatures, which represented some of the excesses of democracy,
concerned the colonial society's elite.137 Even though limiting private
130. Id. at 340-44.
131. Id. at 359.
132. See Joyce Appleby, The Heirs and the Disinherited, in THE CONSTITUTION AND AMERI-
CAN LIFE, supra note 126, at 139.
133. Id. at 140.
134. See Forest McDonald, The Constitution and Hamiltonian Capitalism, in How CAPITAL-
ISTIC Is THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 120, at 49, 55-56.
135. Id. at 51.
136. See id. at 58-62.
137. Appleby, supra note 132, at 139.
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property rights and extensive regulation of the economy were ac-
cepted practices, 3 ' the Federalists were determined to confine the
power of state legislatures. By destroying the economic powers of the
states, the Federalists radically altered the texture of state politics. 39
In doing so they contained the poor's threat to the wealthy by secur-
ing basic property rights. Moreover, they replaced active popular po-
litical involvement by a mobilized population with an efficient, well-
run government devoted to a system of private property rights. Al-
though free to pursue their private interests, the people would be rele-
gated to the margins of politics. Reliance on private gain would
generate an inequality that the new Constitution would encourage and
entrench by concentrating both wealth and power in the hands of the
few. By establishing a highly stratified system of representation and
an elite federal judiciary, most contested issues were removed from
the sphere of politics.140 The United States would be built under a
"government channeled, government encouraged, and sometimes
government subsidized system of private enterprise for personal
profit,""'1 which also ratified slavery for what then appeared to be in
perpetuity.
To secure ratification by state governments, the Bill of Rights was
added to the Constitution.'42 This marked the second major contribu-
tion of the United States to what was later to become the developing
law of international human rights.
A. Civil War and Its Aftermath
Notwithstanding the addition of a Bill of Rights, the framers' con-
stitutional system was constantly challenged by the institution of slav-
ery. 143 The post-bellum enactment of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and
Fifteenth Amendments, and their legislative companions was intended
to establish, as a matter of federal law, the human right to civil equal-
ity for all persons born in the United States, regardless of race. This
was the third time that the Federal Government, in response to a na-
138. Donald J. Pisani, Promotion and Regulation: Constitutionalism and the American Econ-
omy, in THE CONSTITUTION AND AMERICAN LIFE, supra note 126, at 80, 97-98.
139. Appleby, supra note 132, at 145.
140. See Nidelsky, Confining Democratic Politics, supra note 128, at 348.
141. See McDonald, supra note 120, at 71.
142. See HUGH BROGAN, THE PELICAN HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 114-19, 191 (1985).
143. See PETER KOLCHIN, AMERICAN SLAVERY 1619-1877 242 (1993); Harold D. Woodman,
Slavery: Economic Aspects, in THE READERS COMPANION TO AMERICAN HISTORY 992-93 (Eric
Foner & John Garrity eds., 1991).
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tional crisis, established what became a fundamental, internationally
recognized human right.'4
The Reconstruction Congress moved to eradicate a system which
prohibited African Americans from competing as equals in the free
markets with the following measures: the end of slavery and the
badges and incidents thereof, the establishment of legal equality and
citizenship for African Americans, and the franchise. The attempt
was not entirely successful. Both the Reconstruction Amendments
and Civil Rights statutes were in response to a national crisis that ne-
cessitated massive federal intervention to create and sustain human
rights. This program could not be implemented without a constant
federal military presence. 45 Yet, this new regime of civil, political,
and racial equality was designed to establish federal guarantees of so-
cial and economic benefits to former slaves.146 Once again however,
such guarantees were relegated to the state legislatures with the de-
mise of Reconstruction.
Notwithstanding its failure to fully integrate African Americans
into American society, the Constitution served its intended purpose
throughout the 19th and early 20th centuries by establishing a legal
regime which facilitated economic growth through laissez-faire eco-
nomic policy.' 47 The growth of the corporation allowed the state to
forego government and taxation as means to spur economic develop-
ment, and replaced private initiative as the motivation for the manu-
facture of products.'48
The massive growth of corporations prompted calls for federal
regulatory control over them, and over two dozen bills were intro-
duced in Congress to do so.149 Supporters claimed national incorpora-
144. Cf. UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, art. 7, in TwENTY-FIVE HUMAN
RIGHTS DOCUMENTS, supra note 2, at 7; ICCPR arts. 8, 26, in id. at 19, 26.
145. This federal support was relinquished as a consequence of the Hayes-Tilden Compro-
mise of 1876 and the withdrawal of federal troops from the South. See FONER, supra note 17, at
575-601.
146. For example, in 1865, the Freedman's Bureau was established to provide former slaves
and white refugees with medical care, education, oversight of employment contracts and land
deals. Freedmen's courts assumed jurisdiction over cases where one or both parties were ex-
slaves. Although it was implied that southern land would be seized and conveyed to former
slaves in lots of 40 acres, this did not happen. However, some former slaves were able to obtain
land in Florida, Arkansas, and Georgia pursuant to the Southern Homestead Act of 1866. See
JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN AND ALFRED A. MOSS, JR., FROM SLAVERY TO FREEDOM: A HISTORY
OF AFRICAN AMERICANS 227-34 (7th ed. 1994).
147. Pisani, supra note 138, at 80.
148. Id. at 94.
149. Theodore Roosevelt, the National Civic Federation, and the National Association of
Manufacturers were among those who supported such legislation. See id. at 104. See also
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tion could regulate both the size and the operations of corporations,
while opponents denounced these plans as attacks on the states' right
to regulate corporations and argued that federal regulation was im-
practical.15 0 Because the federal and state governments were too
weak to regulate the economy until the 1930s and the emergence of
the New Deal,' towns as well as states competed in countless ways to
attract business. These measures included taxes, usury laws, and cor-
porate charters. They also competed for public buildings, post offices
and land offices, new roads, canals, and rail lines. As discussed below,
this competition to attract business by lowering taxation rates compli-
cated attempts to secure national economic rights.
B. The Depression and the New Deal
Renewed efforts to force the national government to secure eco-
nomic entitlements took place in the 1930s, when world war and eco-
nomic depression again produced national crises that required
national remedies. 5 z President Roosevelt acknowledged this urgency
in his 1941 Eighth Annual Message to Congress, where he spoke of
four freedoms: freedom from want, freedom from fear, freedom to
exercise speech and expression, and freedom to exercise one's relig-
ion. Later, in his 1944 Eleventh Annual Message to Congress,
Roosevelt spelled out the meaning of freedom from want, indicating
that it encompassed "[t]he right to a remunerative job ... [t]he right
to earn enough to provide adequate food and clothing and recreation,
... [t]he right to adequate medical care . . . [t]he right to adequate
protection from the fears of old age, sickness, accident, and unemploy-
ment; and the right to a good education." '53 Roosevelt meant these
ideas to become the nucleus of a "second bill of rights to the Constitu-
tion, one that would include social welfare rights, in order to create a
Michael J. Sandel, The Political Economy of Citizenship, in SKOCPOL & GREENBERG, supra note
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DEAL 1932-1940 (1963); WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, THE FDR YEARS: ON ROOSEVELT AND
His LEGACY (1995); EDWARD ROBB ELLIS, A NATION IN TORMENT: THE GREAT AMERICAN
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new basis of security and prosperity.., for all regardless of station,
race, or creed."
Roosevelt's vision was informed by the groundbreaking economic
rights legislation of the New Deal era, such as the Social Security Act,
the Fair Labor Standards Act, and the National Labor Relations Act.
These laws for the first time interposed the federal government into
the heretofore private struggles between working people and employ-
ers.154 In response to the depredations caused by the deteriorating
economy, in 1939 Roosevelt instructed the National Resources Plan-
ning Board to sponsor a series of investigations concerning employ-
ment, relief, social insurance, housing, and urban development. Three
years later, a Board Committee concluded that an "American stan-
dard" of economic security was a right of every citizen.155 The Com-
mittee argued that the federal government should provide a job for all
those who could not find work in the private economy, and called for
a "right to shelter." '156 However, none of these proposals came to
fruition.157
A final burst of federal activity in the direction of creating various
forms of federally guaranteed minimum welfare guarantees took place
in the 1960s. While our perspective on the period may be too short to
consider it a "crisis" of the magnitude of those that I have hitherto
discussed, the 1960s was clearly a period of domestic and international
upheaval. This stemmed from domestic social movements for racial
and gender equality, greater economic opportunity for all, and
changes in foreign policy including demands for the withdrawal of
United States armed forces from Vietnam. Importantly, the 1960s
witnessed substantial growth in social welfare spending. The growth
between 1964 and 1972 was from 25.4% of the federal budget to
41.3% and from 4.3% of gross national product to 8.8%.158 These
154. This legislation was not without its drawbacks. The Social Security Act, for example,
excluded agricultural and domestic workers from its provisions dealing with unemployment and
old age insurance, thereby eliminating coverage of approximately 65% of working African
Americans, who were still primarily engaged in southern rural agricultural work. Orloff, supra
note 1, at 37, 77.
155. See Edwin Amenta & Theda Skocpol, Redefining the New Deal: World War II and the
Development of Social Provision in the United States, in POLITICS OF SOCIAL POLICY, supra note
1, at 81, 83, 86-94, (discussing COMMITTEE ON LONG RANGE WORK AND RELIEF POLICIES: SE-
CURITY WORK AND RELIEF POLICIES (1942)).
156. Id. at 88, 92; Foner, supra note 17, at 233-34.
157. See Amenta & Skocpol, supra note 155, at 149, 156-62.
158. See Robert M. Collins, Growth Liberalism in the Sixties: Great Societies at Home and




expenditures financed "several hundred legislative initiatives includ-
ing civil rights for blacks, victory in the war on poverty, enhanced edu-
cational opportunity, improved health care for the elderly, a more
acceptable quality of urban life, better environmental protection, and
improved protection for consumers." '159
Indeed, the 1960s were probably the high point for affirmative
governmental policy supporting social welfare rights in the Twentieth
Century, an edifice which has been gradually cut away since that
time.16o
IV. LEGAL SOURCES FOR A REJUVENATION
OF ECONOMIC RIGHTS
In American history, federal provisions of minimum welfare
guarantees have been few and far between, taking place primarily in
periods of profound national crisis. During such periods, federal re-
sources provide the crucial coercive force that makes economic pro-
tections a valued and coherent counterpart to the private market. In
the absence of such crises, the responsibility for protecting such rights
has rested with the state governments. Nonetheless, numerous calls
for federal participation in non-crisis times do continue. These have
taken the form of creative constructions of the Constitution, and
claims that the United States should ratify international instruments
mandating such guarantees. While these debates are ongoing and will
hopefully result in more active federal involvement in the realization
of a true regime of economic rights protections, there is clearly a need
for additional approaches.
A. The Scholarly Debates
Since the 1960s, ideas encouraging federal rights to a job, ade-
quate income, health care, and education have only very slowly
started to take hold in the United States. Spurred by the absence of
laws in this field, a number of scholars have debated whether the Con-
stitution creates some kind of right to economic subsistence. Because
a number of Supreme Court decisions have clearly refused to hold
that the Constitution imposes minimum welfare obligations,' 6' the de-
159. Id.
160. See, e.g., HERSHKOFF & LOFFREDO, supra note 4, at 1314-30; WHAT REAGAN Is DOiNG
To Us (Alan Gartner et al. eds., 1982).
161. See, e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 323 (1980) (no affirmative government obliga-
tion to ensure resources to obtain contraceptives or send children to private schools); Lindsay v.
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bate has centered around whether lower courts can and should find
bases for such rights.
This debate began over twenty-five years ago when Professor
Frank Michelman asked whether such economic guarantees might be
rooted in the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause.1 62
Articulating the right to such protection as one of "minimum protec-
tion against economic hazard," he specified that "a claim to minimum
protection would mean that persons are entitled to have certain wants
satisfied-certain existing needs fulfilled-by government free of any
direct charge over and above the general obligations to pay general
taxes (and perhaps free of conditions referring to past idleness, prodi-
gality, or other economic 'misconduct').' 1 63  Rooting such a claim
within the Equal Protection Clause is not without difficulty. As
Michelman noted,
In shaping the statement of our claims so as to fit the locutions
of the equal protection clause, we must find an 'inequality' to com-
plain about; and the only inequality turns out to be that some per-
sons, less than all, are suffering from inability to satisfy certain
'basic' wants which are presumably felt by all alike. But if we define
the inequality that way, we can hardly avoid admitting that the in-
jury consists more essentially of deprivation than discrimination,
that the cure lies more in provision than equalization, and that the
reality of injury and need for cure are to be determined largely
without reference to whether the complainant's predicament is visi-
bly related to past or current government activity. 164
Akhil Amar has taken a different approach, focusing on the Thir-
teenth Amendment. 165 Reading this Amendment as a determination
that no degraded caste of people shall exist in the United States, he
views this assurance as necessarily entailing a right to minimum sub-
sistence and minimum shelter. Congress has a duty to enforce this
Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972) (no constitutional guarantee of access to dwelling of a particular
quality); Dandridge v.Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 484-86 (1970) (no constitutional deficiency in state
program placing ceiling on amount of welfare benefits); Lavine v. Milne, 424 U.S. 577, 585 n.9
(1975) (welfare benefits are not a fundamental right, and neither the state nor the federal gov-
ernment is under any constitutional obligation to guarantee minimum levels of support);
DeShanney v. Winnebago, 489 U.S. 196 (1989) (Due Process Clause generally "confers no af-
firmative right to government aid, even when such aid may be necessary to secure life").
162. See Frank Michelman, On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83
HARV. L. REV. 7 (1969).
163. Id. at 13.
164. Id.
165. See Akhil Amar, Forty Acres and a Mule: A Republican Theory of Minimum Entitle-
ment, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 37, 40-43 (1990).
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right by appropriate legislation under Section Two of the
Amendment. 166
The ideas of Michelman and Amar by no means exhaust the
range or depth of the discussion. However, all who have addressed
this issue start from two similar premises. First, they seek support for
their arguments solely in the Reconstruction era Amendments to the
Constitution,167 perhaps in recognition that the framers were loath to
place such obligations upon the federal government. Second, each of
the authors acknowledges the slim likelihood that their theories will
persuade the current United States Supreme Court.1 68 A further uni-
fying thread to these arguments is an unfortunate failure to provide a
place for the poor to participate in their own liberation; essentially
leaving them and their struggle for economic security to lawyers and
judges.169
Theorists from all points on the political spectrum have argued
against a reading of the Constitution that imposes minimum welfare
provisions upon federal or state governments. 170  In regard to
Michelman's equal protection theory, Ralph Winter notes the absence
of state action and a judicial standard for determining when the eco-
nomic rights are satisfied. Further, a separation of powers problem
inheres in such a reading of the Constitution because courts can
neither define nor enforce such rights without usurping the legislative
and executive roles. Moreover, he observes that judicial vindication
of these rights would be illegitimate and undemocratic because noth-
ing in our common law or Constitution indicates any acceptance of
such governmental obligation. Further, he asserts that claims of such
rights are misdirected, not in the best interests of the rightsholders,
166. Id.
167. Matthew D. Adler, Judicial Restraint in the Administrative State, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 759,
784, 888 (discussion of minimum entitlement).
168. See LOFFREDO, supra note 3, at 1278, 1388; Amar, supra note 165, at 42-43; David P.
Currie, Positive and Negative Rights, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 866 (1986); Edelman, supra note 3, at 3-
4; William E. Forbath, Why Is This Rights Talk Different From All Other Rights Talk? Demoting
the Court and Reimagining the Constitution, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1771 (1994); Kenneth L. Karst,
Citizenship, Race and Marginality, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 19, 43 (1988); David Woodward,
Affirmative Constitutional Overtones: Do Any Still Sound for the Poor, 7 HuM. RTs. Q. 268
(1985).
169. See Muhammad I. Kenyatta, Community Organizing, Client Involvement, and Poverty
Law, MONTHLY REV., Oct. 1983 at 18, 21.
170. See Ralph K. Winter, Jr., Poverty, Economic Equality, and the Equal Protection Clause,
1972 Sup. CT. REV. 41 (1972); Ronald Dworkin, The Moral Reading of the Constitution, N.Y.
REV. OF BOOKS, Mar. 21, 1996.
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and immoral because they attack the basic liberties of those who
would be called upon to satisfy them. 7'
The theory of this article is not that socio-economic rights can or
should be hewn from contemporary constitutional jurisprudence.
Rather they should be fought for via direct political action by grass-
roots political struggle for constitutional change by the poor and their
political supporters. As such, this article does not enter into a dis-
course with Winter. What remains significant in Judge Winter's article
is his assertion that policymakers, including legislators, should not leg-
islate economic guarantees. 172
B. The Role of International Law
Because the federal judiciary has failed to accept the argument
that minimum welfare guarantees ought to be teased out of the Con-
stitution, many have sought to root such obligations in international
law. Indeed, there are a number of international instruments that use
explicit terminology to identify what I have been referring to as mini-
mum welfare guarantees. However one describes these guarantees,
they exist to eliminate the ravaging effects of global poverty. In this
section, I examine three of the international instruments central to
any discussion of how to create a culture of economic rights in the
United States. The United Nations Charter, the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights, and the International Covenant on Economic,
Social, and Cultural Rights ("International Covenant"), have emerged
from the law-making process of the United Nations after the Second
World War. 1 73 Each is a basis for establishing minimum welfare guar-
antees for the signatory countries that would otherwise have no juridi-
cal foundation. The rights contained in the Universal Declaration and
International Covenant all have their origin in the United Nations
Charter,174 a foundational human rights instrument which "ushered in
a new international law of human rights,' 1 75 and made its specific
human rights provisions binding upon all member states. Below, I
171. See Winter, supra note 170. But see Frank Michelman, Welfare Rights in a Constitutional
Democracy, 1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 659-60 (1979).
172. Winter, supra note 170, at 9, 72, 83.
173. See PAUL GORDON LAUREN, THE EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: VI-
SIONS SEEN 105-38 (1998).
174. See U.N. CHARTER, in CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF HUMAN RIGHTS, TWENTY-FIVE
HUMAN RIGHTS DOCUMENTS, supra note 2.
175. See Louis Henkin, Introduction, in THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS: THE COVE-
NANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 1, 6 (Louis Henkin ed., 1981). See also Schwelb, The
International Court of Justice and the Human Rights Clauses of the Charter, 66 AM. J. OF INT'L. L.
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provide a brief history of these instruments and the rights they
contain.
1. The United Nations Charter
The U.N. Charter was a product of the U.N. Conference on Inter-
national Organizations held in San Francisco in 1945 and the Dumbar-
ton Oaks preparatory conference in Washington in 1944.176 At these
meetings, the United States, together with the United Kingdom, the
Soviet Union, and China, worked to put together a set of internation-
ally binding legal norms that included human rights provisions. The
United States' contributions to this endeavor derived from a draft In-
ternational Bill of Rights prepared in 1942. This document acknowl-
edged that governments exist for the benefit of the people and for the
promotion of their common welfare in an interdependent world. It
further stated that all persons who are willing to work, as well as per-
sons who through no fault of their own are unable to work, have the
right to enjoy such minimum standards of economic, social, and cul-
tural well-being as the resources of the country, effectively used, are
capable of sustaining.177 These ideas, which had been articulated in
President Roosevelt's speeches outlining the "Four Freedoms," were
later incorporated into the Atlantic Charter, which was announced on
August 14, 1941 by Roosevelt and Winston Churchill.' 7 8 The United
Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights used
concepts from the Atlantic Charter, but raised the Atlantic Charter to
the level of international rights and duties' 79 by adding additional
rights to economic progress and social security.
During the U.N. Charter discussions, U.S. Secretary of State Ed-
ward Stettinus referred to Roosevelt's Four Freedoms speech, explain-
ing that freedom from want encompassed the right to work, the right
to social security, and the right to opportunity for advancement. 180 In
337 (1972); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 102(2) (1986).
176. See LAUREN, supra note 173, at 166-71.
177. Id. at 35.
178. M. Glen Johnson, The Contributions of Eleanor and Franklin Roosevelt to the Develop-
ment of International Protections of Human Rights, 9 HUM. RTs. Q. 19, 22-23 (1987).
179. See Imre Szabo, Historical Foundations of Human Rights, in HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS
OF HUMAN RIGHTS: THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION OF HUMAN RiGHrrs 22 (Karel Vasak ed.,
1982).
180. Louis B. Sohn, The New International Law: Protection of the Rights of Individuals
Rather Than States, 32 AM. U. L. REv. 35 (1982). See also 3 U.N. INFORMATION ORGANIZATION,




part because of Stettinus' intervention, Article One of the U.N. Char-
ter identifies a primary purpose of the U.N. as working "to achieve
international cooperation in solving international problems of an eco-
nomic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting
and encouraging respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms
for all..."1 81 while Article Fifty-Five of the Charter mandates that the
United Nations promote higher standards of living, full employment,
conditions of economic and social progress and development, and uni-
versal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental
freedoms. 2 These purposes are buttressed by Article Fifty-Six,
which imposes upon all U.N. members obligations to take joint and
separate action for the achievement of purposes set forth in Article
Fifty-Five.'83 However, attempts by economic rights advocates to util-
ize these principles to establish a juridical foundation for federal wel-
fare rights guarantees are stymied by court decisions which hold that
the human rights provisions of the U.N. Charter are non-self-execut-
ing.18 This precludes U.S. courts from enforcing their provisions in
the absence of prior implementing legislation by Congress.
185
A number of scholars have come up with approaches to counter
this interpretation. Some have taken the position that the human
rights clauses of the Charter should be deemed self-executing, by rea-
son of the mandate of Article VI of the Constitution, which declares
treaties and "laws of the United States" to be the "supreme Law of
the Land.' 8 6 If they are correct in their approach, the U.N. Charter
provisions would supersede earlier federal law, by reason of the last in
181. See U.N. CHARTER art. 1.3, in CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF HUMAN RIGHTS, TwENT'Y-
FIVE HUMAN RIGHTS DOCUMENTS, supra note 2.
182. Id. art. 56, at 2.
183. Id.
184. See Frovola v. U.S.S.R., 761 F.2d 370, 374 n.5 (7th Cir. 1985); Sei Fujii v. State, 242 P.2d
617 (Cal. 1952); Sipes v. McGhee, 25 N.W.2d 638, 644 (1947) (Charter human rights provisions
"merely indicative of a desirable social trend and an objective devoutly to be desired by all well
thinking peoples").
185. See Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (1 Pet.) 253 (1829); United States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862,
878 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 832 (1979); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELA-
TIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 111 (3)(4) cmt. h (1982).
186. See Stefan A. Riesenfeld, The Doctrine of Self-Executing Treaties and U.S. v. Postal, Win
at Any Price, 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 892, 901 (1980); Charles F. Stotter, Self Executing Treaties and
the Human Rights Provisions of the United Nations Charter: A Separation of Powers Problem, 25
BUFF. L. REv. 773, 774, 783-85 (1976) (arguing that the U.N. Charter should be deemed self-
executing, while recognizing that courts have not so held); Egon Schwelb, The International




time rule, and state law by reason of the Supremacy Clause. 18 7 If the
treaty is not self-executing, Congress would simply have to pass imple-
menting legislation to give these provisions meaningful effect.' 88
The other approach adopted by scholars is to claim that the terms
of the U.N. Charter are judicially enforceable as part of customary
international law, arguing that such law is "part of our law, and must
be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of the appro-
priate jurisdiction, as often as questions of right depending upon it are
duly presented by it for their determination. ' '189 This argument has
produced a tidal wave of debate. 9° What stands indisputable is that
the international human rights provisions in the U.N. Charter have
significantly effected American jurisprudence in the early post-war
era.' Sadly, they have not yet successfully been a means to create
federal minimum welfare guarantees in the later post-war era.192
2. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights
The Charter contained neither a definition of human rights nor a
means for their implementation. In response, the preparatory com-
mission of the United Nations, its executive committee, and the Gen-
eral Assembly, recommended that the Economic and Social Council,
itself created by Article Sixty-Eight of the U.N. Charter, establish a
committee to formulate an International Bill of Rights.' 93 In 1946, the
Council established the Commission on Human Rights that undertook
this task. After two sessions between 1947 and 1948, the Commission
completed a comprehensive draft that has become known as the Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights. To further the purposes of the
U.N. Charter, in 1948 the General Assembly adopted the Universal
Declaration which was "intended to be an aspirational non-binding
187. INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT: LAW, POLITICS, MORALS 742 (Henry J.
Steiner & Philip Alston eds., 1996); Whitney v. Robinson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888).
188. Asakura v. Seattle, 265 U.S. 332, 341 (1924); Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. 198, 236-37 (1796).
189. See The Paquette Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900); Sohn, supra note 180, at 12; THEO-
DORE MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN NORMS As CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL
LAW 82 (1989) (the Charter's human rights principles, so elaborated, have become a part of
customary international law).
190. See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 21.
191. See Bert B. Lockwood, Jr., The United Nations Charter and United States Civil Rights
Litigation 1946-1955, 69 IOWA L. REV. 901 (1984).
192. Id. at 902.
193. JOHANNES MORSINK, THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: ORIGINS,
DRAFTING AND INTENT 3-4 (1999); A. GLENN MOWER, JR., INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION FOR
SOCIAL JUSTICE: GLOBAL AND REGIONAL PROTECTION ECONOMIC/SOCIAL RIGHTS 11 (1985).
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common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations. 194
The Declaration set forth the "basic principles" upon which subse-
quent conventions were to be based.1 95 It contained articles covering
civil and political rights, such as the right to be free of discrimination
and to equal protection of the law, the right to be presumed innocent
until proven guilty in a fair and public trial, freedoms of thought, relig-
ion, conscience, movement and assembly. It further guaranteed eco-
nomic rights including the right to an adequate standard of living and
the right to work, supplemented by other means of social protection
including reasonable limitations on working hours and periodic holi-
days. 196 Finally, the Declaration guaranteed cultural rights, such as
the right to a nationality, to education, and to the enjoyment of the
arts and sciences. 1
97
Although the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was not
meant to be a legally binding instrument, 98 some commentators claim
that whatever the intentions of the authors may have been, the Decla-
ration is now part of customary international law.
3. The International Covenant on Economic, Cultural, and
Social Rights
The International Covenant has its roots in the U.N. Declaration
on Human Rights, 199 drafted by the Commission on Human Rights
200
in an almost twenty-year process. In 1976, the International Covenant
was entered into force, and another decade passed before the Cove-
nant was provided with a supervisory body that "was worthy of the
name." 201 After an International Bill of Rights drafting committee
rejected the inclusion of all the rights listed in the Universal Declara-
tion,20 2 the Commission on Human Rights' draft omitted the social
and economic rights considered by the Economic and Social Council
in the summer of 1950.203 This draft was then submitted to the third
194. Hannum, supra note 20, at 131, 137.
195. Id. at 138.
196. Universal Declaration, supra note 144, at arts. 22-28. See also MORSINK, supra note 193,
at 131-238.
197. UNIVERSAL DECLARATION, supra note 144, at arts. 15, 21, 26, 27.
198. John P. Humphrey, General Introduction, in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS:
PROBLEMS OF LAW AND POLICY 7 (R. Lillich & Frank C. Newman eds., 1979).
199. See NATALIE HEVENER KAUFMAN, HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES AND THE SENATE: A
HISTORY OF OPPOSITION 66 (1990).
200. MOWER, supra note 193, at 11.
201. CRAVEN, supra note 3.
202. Id. at 12.
203. MOWER, supra note 193, at 13.
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committee of the General Assembly which passed a resolution man-
dating inclusion of economic and social rights "in accordance with the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights" by a vote of 23-17 with ten
abstentions.2'
This vote to include economic rights was frustrated by the west-
ern states' 205 success in again dividing the document into two cove-
nants: the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the Covenant
on Economic, Cultural and Social Rights. Each covenant had differ-
ent means for monitoring and enforcement.2 °6 The States were to
give the Covenant on Political and Civil Rights immediate effect
through legislative or other measures and make available effective
remedies to any person whose rights had been violated.20 7 In contrast,
each party to the International Covenant agreed to take only econom-
ically practicable steps.2 °8 While since 1977 the U.N. Human Rights
Committee can hear individual petitions for violations of civil and po-
litical rights,20 9 the International Covenant can only examine reports
submitted by states-parties in annual seasons.210 Neither committee
has the authority to order sanctions against non-complying countries.
The International Covenant is the most significant statement of
aspirations for a regime of minimum welfare guarantees protected by
international law.21' It addresses the affirmative right to work,21 2 to
remuneration providing all workers a "decent living for themselves
and their families 21 3 to be free from hunger,21 4 to the enjoyment of
"the highest available standard physical and mental health, '215 to edu-
204. Id.
205. This effort was joined by India. See Craig Scott, The Interdependence and Permeability
of Human Rights Norms: Towards a Partial Fusion of the International Covenants on Human
Rights, 27 OSOOODE HALL L. REv. 769, 792 (1989); Donna Artz, Law Students' Attitudes About
Economic Rights in the Post Cold War World, 19 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 39, 42-43; KAuF-
MAN, supra note 199, at 74.
206. KAUFtAN, supra note 199, at 74-78.
207. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, GAOR, 2200A (XXI), at arts. 2(2),
(3) (1966), in TwENTY FIVE HUMAN Rio-rrs DOcUMNTrs, supra note 2, at 17, 18.
208. Id. at art. 2(1).
209. See id. at arts. 1-2.
210. INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CoNTExT, supra note 187, at 264.
211. See Burns Weston, U.S. Ratification of the International Covenant on Economic, Cul-
tural and Social Rights: With or Without Reservations, in U.S RATIFICATION OF THE HUMAN
RIGHTS TREATIES 27, 29 (Richard B. Lillich ed., 1981).
212. International Covenant on Economic, Cultural, and Social Rights, GAOR, 2200 A
(XXI), at art. 6.1 (1966), in TWENTY FIVE HUMAN RIGirrs DocuMTrs, supra note 2, at 10.
213. Id. at art. 7a(ii).
214. Id. at art. 11.2.
215. Id. at art. 12.1.
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cation,216 and to take part in cultural life and enjoyment of the bene-
fits of scientific progress and its applications.217 Adopted by the
United Nations in 1966, the International Covenant has been ratified
by 132 states-parties, 1 8 including the vast majority of western
states,219 and forms a part of the domestic law in many of the signa-
tory countries. 220  Indeed, of the twenty-two states other than the
United States in the West European and regional groupings, only
three have not ratified the covenant. 221 Although signed and sent to
the Senate by President Carter, the International Covenant has never
been ratified by Congress. In his ratification message to the Senate,
Carter attached a series of reservations, declarations and understand-
ings.222 Carter stated that the covenant "sets forth rights, which while
for the most part are in accord with United States law and practice,
are nevertheless formulated as statements of goals to be achieved pro-
gressively rather than implemented immediately. ' ' 223 He insisted that
Article Two, Paragraph One and Article Eleven import no legally
binding obligation to provide aid to foreign countries,2 24 and that Ar-
ticle Two, Paragraph Two allowed the government to make reasonable
distinctions based upon citizenship.225 Citing Article Two, Paragraph
Three, Carter stated that everyone has the right to own property,
alone as well as in association with others, and that none shall be arbi-
trarily deprived of his property.226 Moreover, he insisted that under
international law, any taking of private property must be non-discrim-
inatory, for a public purpose, and accompanied by prompt, adequate
216. Id. at art. 13.1.
217. Id. at art. 15.1.
218. See INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT, supra note 187, at 1230. For lists of
states-parties, see CRAVEN, supra note 3, at app. III.
219. See Alston, U.S. Ratification of the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights:
The Need for a New Strategy, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 365 (1990).
220. See CRAVEN, supra note 3, at 28.
221. See Alston, supra note 219, at 365.
222. See U.S. RATIFICATION OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES 88 (hereinafter "U.S. RATIFI-
CATION") (Richard B. Lillich ed., 1981).
223. See President's Human Rights Treaty Message to the Senate, 14 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES.
Doc. 395 (Feb. 23, 1978).
224. U.S. RATIFICATION, supra note 222. Article 2, Paragraph 1 states:
Each state party to the present covenant undertakes to take steps, individually and
through international assistance and cooperation, especially economic and technical, to
the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full
realization of the rights recognized in the present covenant by all appropriate means,
including particularly the adoption of legislative measures.
See CRAVEN, supra note 3.
225. U.S. RATIFICATION, supra note 222.
226. Id. at 94-95.
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and effective compensation.227 In regard to Articles Six through Nine,
Carter stated that some of the standards established under these arti-
cles may not be readily translated into legally enforceable rights, while
others are in accord with U.S. policy, but have not yet been fully
achieved.22 8 This was especially the case with Articles Eleven through
Fifteen of the International Covenant, which necessitated a declara-
tion of their non-self-executing nature. 2 9 These reservations pro-
voked the criticism that if adopted under their conditions, the entire
purpose of the treaty would be undermined.23 °
The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations held hearings in
1979, looking at four international human rights treaties: the Interna-
tional Covenant, the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights ("ICCPR"), the International Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Race Discrimination ("ICERD"), and the American
Convention on Human Rights. Regarding the International Cove-
nant, Carter administration officials made clear in testimony before
the Senate Committee that the International Covenant would not
alone create any immediate rights and was fully consistent with over-
all U.S. policies and supported ratification of all four treaties. 31
Those who testified before the Senate supported ratification of all
four treaties. These groups included bar associations, public interest
organizations, international human rights groups, church organiza-
tions, and well recognized professors of international law. 32 Given
227. Id. at 95.
228. Id. at 96.
229. Id. at 97.
230. Professor David Weissbrodt claimed that Carter's message raised issues that were either
"trivial, unnecessary, violative of international law, or a combination of the above," and argued
that the reservations were either designed to allow the administration to argue that there were
no legal or constitutional impediments to ratification, or that government lawyers had "lost sight
of the reasons for ratifying the Covenant in the first place." See David Weissbrodt, United States
Ratification of the Human Rights Covenants, 63 MINN. L. REV. 35, 77-78 (1978). Although much
of Weissbrodt's criticisms were directed to reservations concerning ICCPR, clearly some applied
to ICESCR. See id. at 53-62, 63-72.
231. Warren Christopher explained, ICESCR
looks to the future, it commits states to take steps toward the future realization of
certain economic, social and cultural goals for the individual. These goals are ones to
which the United States has long been committed including the right to work, to social
necessities, to physical and mental health, to education, and to freedom from hunger.
Id. at 21.
232. The treaties were supported by a number of legal organizations: the American Bar As-
sociation, the American Association of the International Association of Jurists; International
Human Rights Law Group, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People,
and the ACLU. Labor and human rights monitoring groups testified in support, including the
AFL-CIO, Helsinki Watch, Amnesty International, and the International League for Human
Rights. Large numbers of religious denominations testified in support, such as the National
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these factors, one may rightfully wonder why ratification of the Inter-
national Covenant not only failed but essentially ground to a halt.23 3
No Senate Committee discussions reveal members' views about
the treaties before them, and no full Senate discussion left a record of
floor debates. However, it is possible to get some sense of how the
more vocal members of the Senate Committee felt about the treaties.
Senator Jacob Javits indicated that he was concerned about whether
the treaties could be deemed "self-executing, '234 and how they would
affect domestic law.23 5 Senator Jesse Helms expressed concern at the
very beginning of the hearings about the effect of the International
Covenant and the ICCPR on private property rights, noting that Pres-
ident Carter's decision to sign the treaties before the Senate reversed
the position of previous presidents. Helms further noted that Ameri-
can property abroad could be expropriated pursuant to International
Covenant, in violation of the Universal Declaration.236
Over time, U.S. officials have expressed numerous reservations
about the International Covenant, maintaining that economic, cul-
tural, and social rights are foreign to traditionally recognized Ameri-
can constitutional rights. These officials feel that these rights belong
in a "qualitatively different category" from other rights, and they
should not be seen as rights at all, but rather goals of economic and
social policy. According to these arguments, economic and social
rights are easily abused by repressive governments as justifications for
violations of civil rights. During the Cold War, the Department of
State viewed the International Covenant as a "socialist manifesto,
' 23 7
Council of Churches, the U.S. Catholic Conference, the National Jewish Community Relations
Council; the American Lutheran Church, the Lutheran Church in America, the American Asso-
ciation of Evangelical Lutherans, the United Methodist Church, the Unitarian Universalist, the
United Presbyterians, the Christian Church Council of Churches in the U.S. and Canada, and
Church Women United. In addition, a number of prominent international law scholars testified
in support of the treaties.
233. The United States has since ratified the ICCPR, (See Text of the Resolution of Ratifica-
tion, Apr. 2, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 648, 649 (1992)) giving the United States the "unique distinction" of
being the only country in the world that has ratified ICCPR, but has not ratified ICESCR.
234. See International Human Rights Treaties: Hearings Before the Senate Committee on For-
eign Relations, 96th Cong. 35, at 270-72 (1979).
235. Id. at 126. Javits requested that experts examine whether the treaties were self-execut-
ing and their effect on domestic law. See id. at 275-316.
236. Helms criticized President Carter for signing ICESCR on the ground that it would "le-
gitimize the unlawful expropriation without compensation or arbitrary seizure of Americans'
property overseas. Furthermore, ratification by the Senate would again for the first time have
the United States formally acquiesce to Socialist and Marxist governments' denial of basic indi-
vidual economic rights." INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RiGHTs IN CONTEXT, supra note 187, at 759-
60.
237. See Stark, supra note 124, at 81.
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and deemed the rights included therein to represent political, not legal
commitments. 238 These views confirm Alston's observation that many
in the United States government refer to the International Covenant
as the "covenant on Uneconomic, Socialist and Collective Rights."239
In looking for a deeper and more historic explanation for U.S.
antipathy to the International Covenant, a number of scholars have
noted that the arguments raised against the ratification of the Interna-
tional Covenant closely resemble those put forth to defeat ratification
of all human rights treaties since the Bricker Amendment in the
1950s. The amendments proposed by Senator Bricker of Ohio were
designed to make it virtually impossible for the United States to ad-
here to any international human rights treaties. 24° Bricker, operating
in the context of the Cold War and in the aftermath of Senate consid-
eration of the Genocide Convention,24' was motivated by concern that
human rights treaty instruments would be used as a basis for ending
racial segregation and discrimination in the United States.
2 42
Bricker's campaign mobilized opposition to human rights treaties on
the grounds that ratification would diminish basic constitutional
rights, violate states' rights, promote world government, subject citi-
zens to trial abroad, threaten the American form of government, en-
238. See Lori Fisler Damrosch, International Human Rights Law in Soviet and American
Courts, 100 YALE L.J. 2315, 2319 (1991).
239. See Alston, supra note 219, at 366.
240. In its principle version, the operative language of the amendment read:
Sec. 1: A provision of a treaty which denies or abridges any right enumerated in this
Constitution shall not be of any force or effect.
Sec. 2: No treaty shall authorize or permit any foreign power or any international or-
ganization to supervise, control, or adjudicate rights of citizens of the United States
within the United States enumerated in this Constitution or any other matter essen-
tially within the domestic jurisdiction of the United States.
Sec. 3: A treaty shall become effective as internal law in the United States only though
the enactment of appropriate legislation by the Congress.
Sec. 4: All Executive and other agreements between the President and any interna-
tional organization, foreign power, or official thereof shall be made only in the manner
and to the extent prescribed by law. Such agreements shall be subject to the limitations
imposed on treaties, or the making of treaties, by this article.
See KAUFMAN, supra note 199, at 96-103, 201-3. The Senate Judiciary Committee held hearings
on the amendment in May and June of 1952, and ultimately voted the amendment out of Com-
mittee. However, the Senate adjourned without debating the issue. In January 1953, the amend-
ment was reintroduced with the support of sixty-two Senators. Because passage of the
amendment seemed likely, the Eisenhower administration, in a move calculated to defeat pas-
sage, promised that it would not accede to international human rights covenants or conventions.
See Henkin, U.S. Ratification of Human Rights Conventions: The Ghost of Senator Bricker, 89
AM. J. INT'L L. 341, 349 (1995).
241. KAUFMAN, supra note 199, at 36-63.
242. See id. at 310.
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hance Communist influence, infringe on domestic jurisdiction, create
self-executing obligations, and increase international entanglements.
Although these concerns have not entirely precluded U.S. ratifi-
cation of human rights treaties, they have prompted attachment of
reservations to the ratifications that seriously undercut their effect.
Louis Henkin has summarized the effect of these reservations:
1. The United States will not undertake any treaty obligation that it
will not be able to carry out because it is inconsistent with the
United States Constitution.
2. United States adherence to an international human rights treaty
should not effect-or-promise change in existing United States law
or practice.
3. The United States will not submit to the jurisdiction of the Inter-
national Court of Justice to decide disputes as to the interpreta-
tion or application of human rights conventions.
4. Every human rights treaty to which the United States adheres
should be subject to a 'federalism' clause so that the United
States could leave implementation of the Convention largely to
the states.
5. Every international human rights agreement should be non-self-
executing.
243
As Henkin notes, the net effect of these principles is to "achieve
virtually what the Bricker Amendment sought and more." 2'
If Henkin is right about these principles, it seems extremely un-
likely that the U.S. will ratify the International Covenant soon. If it is
ratified, it too will be crippled by reservations. This appears to be the
case, even though some have publicly supported ratification,245 and
former Secretary of State Warren Christopher indicated his support
for the International Covenant.246
The dearth of legislative or executive activity concerning the In-
ternational Covenant makes it unlikely that the United States will se-
riously consider the numerous other international instruments which
contain social welfare guarantees. The United States ignores even
243. Henkin, supra note 240, at 341.
244. Id. at 349.
245. See Paul Savoy, Time for a Second Bill of Rights, NATION, June 17, 1991, at 797 (advo-
cating the adoption of an economic bill of rights); Thomas J. Ehr, After 40 Years, Let's Ratify
U.N. Bill of Rights, N.Y. TImEs, Jan. 1, 1989, at El0.
246. On June 14, 1993, Christopher told the World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna,
Austria that he would seek to obtain the Senate's consent to ratification of the ICESCR Cove-
nant and three other human rights conventions. See Democracy and Human Rights: Where
America Stands, 4 U.S. DEPT. OF STATE DISPATCH, June 21, 1993.
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those that it has signed, such as the International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, which "guarantees
the right of everyone, without distinction as to race or color or na-
tional or ethnic origin" to the rights to work, to free choice of employ-
ment, to just and favorable conditions of work, to protection against
unemployment, to equal pay for equal work, to just and favorable re-
muneration, to housing, to public health, medical care, social security
and social services, education and training, and equal participation in
cultural activities.247
V. THE ROLE OF THE STATES
A. Current State Obligations
Since neither the U.S. Constitution nor international law have yet
been construed to create federal minimum welfare guarantees, we
must go back to the original protector of the poor - state law. Histori-
cally, state and local governments have played the primary role in as-
suming responsibility for those unable to care for themselves. 248 This
continues to be the case today.24 9 The language of state statutory and
constitutional law often contains explicit intentions to provide mini-
mum welfare guarantees. These have frequently provided the basis
for court decisions upholding state economic rights.25 0 These cases
were argued by crusading lawyers working at all levels of state legal
systems.25 ' Indeed, one of the foremost scholars of state constitu-
tional jurisprudence noted, "the concept of public entitlement was
part of the state constitutional jurisprudence from its inception. '25 2 A
look at the minimum welfare provisions guaranteed by state constitu-
tions shows that such protections are substantial. A large number of
247. Id. at 5.e (i)-(vi).
248. Irving Bernstein, Americans in Depression and War, in 1 THE LEAN YEARS: A HISTORY
OF THE AMERICAN WORKER (1960).
249. See Stark, supra note 124, at 92-94.
250. Stephen Marks, UNESCO and Human Rights: The Implementation of Rights Relating to
Education, Science, Culture and Communication, 13 TEX. INT'L L.J. 35, 91 (1977).
251. CAUSE LAWYERING: POLITICAL COMMITMENTS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES
(Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold eds., 1998). See also MARTHA F. DAVIS, BRUTAL NEED:
LAWYERS AND THE WELFARE RIGHTS MOVEMENT, 1960-1973 (1993); Symposium, Conversations
on Progressive Social Change, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 285 (1996).
252. STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (Robert F. Williams ed., 1988).
See also Bert Neuborne, State Constitutions and the Evolution of Positive Rights, 20 RUTGERS
L.J. 881, 898 (1965) (many state constitutions can be deemed "communitarian" or even "popu-
list" since they are enabling documents which recognize that it is the responsibility of the states
to deal with education, food, shelter and health care).
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court decisions have held that individuals are entitled to state-pro-
vided minimum welfare guarantees. 53
Despite the existence of these statutory and constitutional provi-
sions and their judicial constructions, many state governments have
failed to provide necessary minimum economic guarantees. The in-
habitants of these states will be forced to do without if there are no
federal assurances. Moreover, in times of structural change or eco-
nomic downturn, the poor often find themselves scapegoated and see
their state benefits reduced. To the extent that such rights are not
enshrined in the state constitution, the poor have often been the first
to be cast aside by legislative revocation of state benefit schemes. Be-
cause tax revenues generally pay for socio-economic benefits, states
have tremendous incentive to reduce or eliminate benefits and shrink
the tax burden on individual and corporate taxpayers.254
Between 1990 and 1994, seventeen states reduced or eliminated
their aid for non-elderly poor people without dependent children, and
in Ohio, Michigan, Illinois and Pennsylvania alone, more than 350,000
general assistance recipients had their benefits cut off.255 Michigan
cut off single adults who were previously entitled to welfare benefits.
The state of New Jersey, with the consent of the Secretary of U.S.
Dept. of Health and Human Services, imposed a "family cap" which
eliminated a standard increase in benefits for any child born to benefi-
ciaries of the Aid to Families of Dependent Children program. After
challenges by the ACLU, this drastic change was upheld by the
courts. 6 Similar proposals have been put forth by the states of Geor-
gia, Arkansas, Massachusetts, and Wisconsin.257 The Welfare Reform
Act of 1996 mandated that welfare recipients move from welfare to
jobs. Since its passage, the situation has become more dire for the
poor.
The various states' benefit levels vary widely. 258 In 1993, Rhode
Island gave a mother with two children an annual cash grant of $6,793,
whereas South Carolina offered a household of the same size $2,263.
253. See Stark, supra note 124.
254. See Note, Devolving Welfare Programs to the States: A Public Choice Perspective, 109
HARV. L. REV. 1984, 1988-89 & n.23 (1996). See generally Peter D. Enrich, Saving the States
from Themselves: Commerce Clause Restraints on Tax Incentives for Business, 100 HARV. L.
REV. 277 (1996); Richard B. Stewart, Madison's Nightmare, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 335, 337 (1990);
Neil DeMause, To The Highest Bidder, IN THESE TIMES, May 31, 1998, at 11.
255. See David Hatchett, In Short, IN THESE TIMES, June 12, 1995, at 6.
256. See C.K. v. Shalala, 883 F. Supp 991, 1014-15 (D.N.J. 1995).
257. Cory Juris, Unthinking Cap, IN THESE TIMES, Mar. 6, 1995, at 24-26.
258. See Hacker, supra note 11, at 12.
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While some of these discrepancies reflect legitimate cost of living vari-
ances, others are designed to punish the resident poor and discourage
others from moving to the state, similar to the "warning out" tactics of
the colonial era.25 9
B. Enhancing State Obligations
Because there are as yet no federal or international minimum
welfare guarantees, advocates for such rights must work to enhance
current state obligations. This can be accomplished via direct ballot
initiatives, constitutional conventions, and constitutional commissions.
These mechanisms have been increasingly used to bypass state electo-
ral and legislative logjams for the purpose of changing or setting social
policy. In this section, I evaluate their potential to force a public dis-
cussion of minimum welfare guarantees in the United States. Can
these procedures successfully spark debate and implementation of ec-
onomic rights guarantees in the states that do not provide such guar-
antees? Can such a debate move federal authorities to reconsider
their approach to International Covenant and human rights treaties
generally? I address these questions below.
1. Statutory Ballot Initiatives
Statutory initiatives allow mobilized sectors of the population to
place issues on state electoral ballots simply by demonstrating through
a petition process that significant numbers of people wish to express
their voice on an issue.260 Similar to the ballot initiative is the referen-
dum process that allows citizens to ratify legislation previously en-
acted by the legislature. 261 There are three kinds of referenda:
"mandatory," "voluntary," and "popular." "Mandatory" or "compul-
sory" referenda require the legislature to submit certain bills to the
electorate for approval. "Voluntary" referenda give the legislature
259. Rudolph Guliani in 1993 declared that he would "end welfare by the end of this century
completely." He proposed that this would rid his state of many of its poor people. Their depar-
ture, he said, would be a 'natural consequence' of a reduction in benefits. See New York Welfare
Cuts Won't Spur an Exodus, GREENS3ORo NEWS AND REC., May 10, 1995, at A14. The United
States Department of Agriculture has concluded that New York city routinely violated the law
by denying poor people the right to promptly apply for food stamps, failing to make applications
available, failing to screen families for emergency food needs, and cutting off food stamps to
needy families who were still eligible for those benefits. See Rachel L. Swarns, U.S. Audit Is Said
to Criticize Giuliani's Strict Welfare Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 1999, at Al.
260. See Julian Eule, Judicial Review of Direct Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1503, 1510 (1990).
261. See David B. Magleby, Let the Voters Decide?: An Assessment of the Initiative and Refer-
endum Process, 66 U. CoLo. L. REv. 13, 14 (1995).
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the choice of whether to send enacted measures to the electorate.
"Popular" referenda allow the electorate to use petition campaigns to
force the legislature to submit legislation to the electorate for ap-
proval that would not otherwise be submitted pursuant to the compul-
sory or voluntary referenda.262
These various forms of "direct democracy" have their roots in the
western states, bastions of the "Progressive Movements" in the early
twentieth century.2 63 These movements used popular initiatives and
referenda because they viewed political parties, state legislatures, gov-
ernors, city councils and mayors as part of a corrupt political party
system.264 The Progressive Movement's reforms were designed to
give people direct input into the lawmaking process. When they were
successful, they caused a fundamental shift in American politics, pro-
viding individual citizens greater leverage over political parties and
elected officials.265 Until the 1940s, the initiative was used for various
types of social reform, including efforts to eliminate "social and eco-
nomic distress." Numerous attempts to introduce redistributive mea-
sures were made, including efforts in California to establish pension
programs.266
Achieving social reform through direct democracy appeals to
those who advocate minimum welfare guarantees for a number of rea-
sons. The recent evisceration of minimum welfare provisions has oc-
curred unopposed because the poor do not take part in the
representative political process and, thus, have relinquished a legiti-
mate means of defending their interests. Because the poor do not
form a powerful enough voting constituency to curry the favor of ma-
jor political parties, they are denied the political representation en-
joyed by the rich. Some have suggested that because of this reality,
262. Eule refers to these referenda provisions as "complementary direct democracy" because
they require legislative action, in addition to electoral approval, before the law becomes effec-
tive. Eule, supra note 260, at 1512.
263. See David B. Magleby, supra note 261, at 13, 14-15; DAVID D. SCHMIDT, CITIZEN
LAWMAKERS: THE BALLOT INITIATIVE REVOLUTION 10-14; THOMAS E. CRONIN, DIRECT DE-
MOCRACY: THE POLITICS OF INITIATIVE, REFERENDUM AND RECALL 50-51 (1989); Janice C.
May, The Constitutional Initiative: A Threat to Rights?, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE STATES: NEW
DIRECTIONS IN CONSTITUTIONAL POLICYMAKING 163, 167 (Stanley Friedelbaum ed., 1988).
264. Magleby, supra note 261, at 16; DAVID MAGLEBY, DIRECT LEGISLATION 21 (1984);
Richard B. Collins & Dale Oesterle, Structuring the Ballot Initiative: Procedures That Do and
Don't Work, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 47, 56 (1995); Cynthia L. Fountaine, Note, Lousy Lawmaking:
Questioning the Desirability and Constitutionality of Legislating by Initiative, 61 S. CAL. L. REV.
733, 736-37 (1988).
265. Magleby, supra note 261, at 17; Chip Lowe, Public Safety Legislation and the Referen-
dum Power, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 591, 600 (1986).
266. Magleby, supra note 261, at 16 n.12; SCHMIDT, supra note 263, at 18-20.
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legislative and executive acts that affect the poor should be subject to
close judicial scrutiny.267 Both the Republican and the Democratic
parties are beholden to large financial donors whose interests are not
furthered by providing minimum welfare guarantees to the poor.
Therefore, as long as economic rights reform is sought through our
two-party system, incumbents will continue to focus on the wishes of
the well-financed groups and individuals who have helped them
achieve power and office through massive financial contributions.268
In addition, a strategy seeking to obtain minimum welfare guar-
antees through the two-party system is hindered by America's politi-
cal past. Historic voting patterns make it extremely unlikely that
those who most consistently exercise their right to vote in national
elections would support minimum welfare guarantees. Those who
would support such guarantees constitute a poor and small fraction of
the electorate who are often too politically alienated to participate in
candidate elections.
These voting patterns are exacerbated by structural features of
candidate elections. The extreme costs of political campaigns,269 the
continuing legal protection for private financing of election cam-
paigns, 2 ° and "winner take all" election rules, such as the "first past
the post system" and the "single member plurality" rule virtually as-
sure that non-mainstream political parties which successfully re-
present large minorities in candidate elections will be deprived of
electoral representation.
The wealthy tend to vote and are unlikely to vote against their
economic interest.271 The economically successful resist economically
redistributive programs because they believe that their personal eco-
nomic success is due to their individual economic initiative instead of
267. See Loffredo, supra note 3.
268. See David Kairys, You Get What You Pay For, IN THESE TIMES, Feb. 19, 1996, at 35
(reviewing THOMAS FERGUSON, GOLDEN RULE: THE INVESTMENT THEORY OF PARTY COMPETI-
TION AND THE LOGIC OF MONEY DRIVEN POLITICAL SYSTEMS (1996)).
269. It has been estimated that a presidential race costs between $600 million and $1 billion,
and that it now takes $5 million to run a successful Senate campaign (in some states as much as
$30 million) and that even a seat in the House can cost $2 million. Ronald Dworkin, The Curse
of American Politics, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, Oct. 17, 1996, at 19 (citing Max Frankel, T.V. Rem-
edy for a T.V. Malady, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 1996, at 36-38 (1996)).
270. See Santa Clara Co. v. Southern Pacific Railroad, 118 U.S. 394 (1886); Buckley v. Valeo,
424 U.S. 1 (1976); National Bank of Boston v. Belloti, 435 U.S. 365 (1978).
271. See Jamin Raskin & John Bonifaz, The Constitutional Imperative and Practical Superior-
ity of Democratically Financed Elections, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1181-82 (1994) (noting that "voter
turnout clearly decreases with income and socio-economic status").
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any governmental largesse.27 2 Moreover, the wealthy tend to vote Re-
publican rather than Democratic, 27 3 partially because the Republican
party has often been the first to reduce government welfare
spending.274
Today's arguments for direct democracy echo those articulated by
progressive reformers earlier in the century. Ballot initiatives on eco-
nomic rights issues bypass candidate elections and the two-party sys-
tem. If one is able to obtain enough signatures, one can put issues
directly before the electorate. In states that require legislative action
before an issue may appear in a ballot, the impediments discussed in
the text would still exist. However, in sixteen states, citizens can by-
pass the legislature entirely through the initiative process and put is-
sues directly on the ballot. In most of these states, citizen initiatives
require the signatures of only 5 to 10% of the electorate and can be
passed by a majority vote. 2 75 This allows those who are not profes-
sional politicians to initiate major public debate on economic re-
form.27 6 As such, grassroots movements and local activists can
influence political change. Unquestionably, ballot initiatives have the
potential to force local discussion of important issues that directly
concern the people.277
However, recent empirical studies question whether these argu-
ments have been borne out in practice. They raise concerns that bal-
lot initiatives may have been co-opted by the same socio-economic
interests that have dominated candidate elections and party politics.
There is a great cost attached to the first step of all ballot initiatives:
the gathering of signatures on a petition.278 Some states require many
272. There is some evidence that these views are even prevalent among lower income
groups. See Rodolfo 0. de la Garza, The Effects of Ethnicity on Political Culture, in CLASSIFY-
ING By RACE 339 (Paul E. Peterson ed., 1995) (citing Stanley Feldman, Structure and Consis-
tency in Public Opinion: The Role of Core Beliefs and Values, 32 AM. J. POL. Sci. 416 (1983)).
273. See Michael G. Calantvano, Note, The Revision of American State Constitutions: Legis-
lative Power, Popular Sovereignty, and Constitutional Change, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1473, 1502-03 &
n.183 (1987).
274. See SKOCPOL & GREENBERG, supra note 13, at 1, 7.
275. See May, supra note 263.
276. Magleby, supra note 261, at 15-17.
277. Philip Weiser, Note, Ackerman's Proposal for Popular Constitutional Lawmaking: Can
it Realize His Aspirations for Dualist Democracy, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 907, 926 (noting that there
are more opportunities for grass roots politics at the state level than at the national level). See
also SCIMIDT, supra note 263, at 25-30 (summarizing benefits of direct democracy as a more
accountable government, greater citizen participation, a better informed electorate and a safe-
guarding against the concentration of political power in the hands of a few).
278. MAGLEBY, supra note 264, at 36-44.
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signatures to ensure the credibility of the process.279 In addition, bal-
lot initiative laws may require that the petition signatures be geo-
graphically dispersed throughout the state and notarized.28 ° Meeting
ballot initiative requirements is very expensive, 281 and has generated
an "initiative industry" which mobilizes volunteers, consultants, poll-
sters, and media consultants.282
Once the signature requirement is met, the initiative either goes
directly on the ballot (direct initiative) or is placed before the state
legislature, which then has the opportunity to enact legislation, (indi-
rect initiative).283 If an economic rights issue were to appear on the
ballot, the next question is whether those groups most likely to vote
for economic rights initiatives will show up at the polls. After all, the
initiative process is meant to re-empower the voters who are alienated
from the two-party system's candidate campaigns. Most studies con-
clude however, that voters who participate in state ballot initiatives
are demographically similar to those who participate in candidate
elections z.2 4  These voters tend to be well educated, affluent, and
white.285 On a national scale, ballot initiatives have not demonstrated
that they will bring new voters into the political process, 86 perhaps
because the initiatives are often extremely difficult to understand. 87
279. The vast majority of initiatives fail to get on the ballot because they did not attract the
requisite number of signatures. Magleby, supra note 261, at 23; Louis J. Sirico, Jr. The Constitu-
tionality of the Initiative and the Referendum, 65 IOWA L. REv. 637, 659, 661 (1980).
280. Peter J. Galie & Christopher Pobst, Changing State Constitutions: Dual Constitutional-
ism and the Amending Process, 1 HOFSTRA L. & POL'Y SYMP. 27, 51 (1996).
281. In November, 1998, California electors voted on a ballot measure concerning casino-
style gaming on Indian lands on which the proponents and opponents together raised $60 million
and spent $53 million. See Todd S. Purdam, Costly Fight Rages in California Over Indian Gam-
bling Measure, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 1998, at Al, A15. This surpassed the previous spending
record on a ballot initiative set two years ago of $57.3 million on a securities fraud proposal. Id.
282. Magleby, supra note 261, at 23-24, 30.
283. See id. at 35.
284. Calantvano, supra note 273; Weiser, supra note 277, at 907, 925 (referenda at the state
level have not resulted in thoughtful deliberation by the public, but rather manipulation of the
electorate by well organized and well funded groups); MAGLEBY, supra note 264, at 103 (citing
Massachusetts study in which low income respondents indicated low voting rates on
propositions).
285. Calantvano, supra note 273, 1502-03 n.183; Magleby, supra note 261, at 19, 33 (the abil-
ity of voters to cope with direct legislation is strongly correlated with high levels of education
and interest and many poor, uneducated and younger voters thus remain disenfranchised);
CRONIN, supra note 263, at 77 (lower income voters often refrain from voting when the wording
of ballot issues gets too complicated); Weiser, supra note 277, at 926 (electoral turnout is heavily
biased toward more affluent voters).
286. MAGLEBY, supra note 264, at 34.
287. See Magleby, supra note 261, at 24-25, 34, 39 (discussing a 1980 rent control initiative in
which three fourths of California voters did not match their views on rent control with their vote
on the proposition; 23% wanted to protect rent control but incorrectly voted "yes" and 54%
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Historically, well-financed groups push ballot initiatives after
their efforts failed in the legislature. Rarely do initiatives correlate
with those topics that concern the general public.2 88 In particular, bal-
lot issues are rarely concerned with the poor, the less educated, and
those who lack political education or financial resources. 289 Most citi-
zen and grassroots groups concerned with these constituencies lack
the resources or organizational commitment to get their issues on
statewide ballots. 29
These drawbacks notwithstanding, ballot initiatives should not be
condemned. According to Lee, "[t]he initiative and referendum must
be tested not against a theoretical model of democratic institutions
but the real world of declining participation, weakened political par-
ties, partisan legislative districting, and television-dominated election
campaigns funded by massive contributions from special interests that
also dominate legislative lobbying., 291 The obstacles to rational deci-
sion-making and self-help are not peculiar to the referendum process,
but complicate the entire political system. 92 Moreover, polls indicate
that direct legislative devices retain their popularity with the general
public, which seems to want more, not less of them. 93
2. Constitutional Initiatives, Commissions and Conventions
While the ballot initiative, as a means of "direct democracy," can
obtain state legislation on economic rights issues, it is unclear whether
it can bring about results any more favorable than traditional political
parties. I therefore examine other methods of direct democracy: con-
stitutional initiatives, constitutional conventions, and constitutional
commissions, which have been effective at the state level for constitu-
tional as opposed to statutory reform. Because reforming a constitu-
tion is a far more serious matter than merely passing legislation, major
constitutional reform is very rare in the twentieth century.
were opposed to rent control, but incorrectly voted "no"); CRONIN, supra note 263, at 74 (citing
analysis of a 1976 nuclear power measure finding that 14% of the sample interviewed voted
contrary to their stated intentions).
288. For example, in 1992, voters indicated that the economy, unemployment and the deficit
were the most important problems facing the nation and yet the 1992 direct legislation cam-
paigns rarely focused on these issues. See MAGLEBY, supra note 264, at 182, 184; Magleby, supra
note 261, at 35.
289. Magleby, supra note 261, at 36.
290. Id.
291. Eugene C. Lee, The American Experience, 1778-1978, in THE REFERENDUM DEVICE 58
(Austin Ranney ed., 1981).
292. Lowe, supra note 265, at 605-06.
293. Lee, supra note 291, at 58; CRONIN, supra note 263, at 4.
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a. Legislative and Constitutional Initiative
The most common means to amend a state constitution is the
state legislative initiative, which is used primarily for "minor" reforms
and frequently requires popular ratification.294 As of 1993, over 90%
of state constitutional amendments were adopted by use of the legisla-
tive initiative.295 The constitutional initiative is in many ways similar
to the legislative initiative except that the constitutional initiative can
only be changed by a subsequent vote of the people, whereas legisla-
tive initiatives may be amended by the legislature.296 The constitu-
tional initiative is common,297 but not always used for "progressive"
29purposes. 98 Although rights issues have rarely been raised in initia-
tives,2 99 and economic rights issues have not been raised at all, it is
clear that where rights issues have been raised, voters have more fre-
quently reduced, rather than expanded these rights. Proposals oppos-
ing busing, eliminating fair housing ordinances, establishing referenda
on low-income housing, requiring English only, and restricting the
rights of lesbians, gay men, and the criminally charged have passed. A
substantial number of pro-rights measures have failed.3 °° Many suc-
cessful proposals have urged conservative positions on lifestyle,
morals, and race. Many others have targeted judicial decisions
favorable to a liberal construction of social and economic rights. Fi-
nally, both the constitutional referendum and initiative carry with
them the same structural voter participation problems as the statutory
ballot initiative.30 '
294. Id. at 34.
295. Galie & Pobst, supra note 280, at 32.
296. See MAGLEBY, supra note 264, at 72; Magleby supra, note 261, at 13.
297. Seventeen states allow voters to amend their constitutions without a constitutional con-
vention. May, supra note 263, at 167.
298. See Bruce Cain, The Contemporary Context of Ethnic and Racial Politics in California,
in RACIAL AND ETHNIC POLInCS IN CALIFORNIA 23-24 (Byron 0. Jackson & Michael Preston
eds., 1991) (arguing that the conservative tenor of several recent initiatives is a reaction by the
white, middle class voters to increased representation of minorities in legislatures).
299. Of a total of 628 measures pertaining to rights, only 23 involved rights such as speech,
press, religion, assembly, equality, and rights of the accused. The most numerous pertained to
women's rights. See May, supra note 263, at 168.
300. Id. at 169; Magleby, supra note 261, at 16 n.12.
301. See Sherman J. Clark, A Populist Critique of Direct Democracy, 112 HARV. L. REV. 467
(1998) ("[R]epresentative government, through a combination of legislative and electoral log-
rolling, allows and in fact requires voters to take into account the relative intensity of their
various preferences in deciding how to make use of their allotment of political power. Direct
democratic processes, by contrast, effectively preclude logrolling by presenting voters with a
single issue in isolation."); Richard Rose, Rough Judgments: The Interpretation of Elections, EN-
COUNTER, Mar. 1982, at 58, 64 ("[R]eferendum is a particularly bad way to decide an issue be-




The constitutional commission is something of a hybrid mecha-
nism for state constitutional reform. It seeks to avoid the potential
"demagogy" of the direct referendum approach as well as the systems
that channel all constitutional reform through party politicians.302
Commissions are usually selected by legislative or gubernatorial ap-
pointment, perhaps with the participation of the state's Chief Justice,
and are charged with the task of assuming leadership for constitu-
tional change.3 °3 Constitutional commissions can also be appointed
through private lobbying and may be entirely privately financed
°.3
Once appointed, constitutional commissions assume various responsi-
bilities depending on the breadth of their constitutional charge, which
may range from the mere study of constitutions, through making rec-
ommendations, to laying the groundwork for a constitutional
convention.305
c. Constitutional Conventions
Constitutional conventions are reserved for when the constitution
has accumulated unnecessary detail or contains inconsistent or obso-
lete provisions; social and economic transformation requires constitu-
tional modernization; the legislature is indifferent or actively opposed
to any constitutional change, which becomes especially important
when the change involves reapportionment, term limits, unicameral-
ism, the initiative and referendum or fiscal reform; and issues are pre-
sent that are too complex to be dealt with by voters through
amendment.30 6 Conventions may be called to work on an agenda that
has been previously limited by popular vote known as the "limited"
convention. They may also be entirely open-ended and "unlim-
ited."30 7 The unlimited convention, as can be imagined, presents the
risk of a "runaway convention" where everything is up for grabs.
Galie & Pobst refer to this as the "Pandora's Box" problem. Based on
the evidence, however, they conclude that there is
302. Robert Williams, Are State Constitutional Conventions a Thing of the Past? The Increas-
ing Role of the State Constitutional Commission in State Constitutional Change, 1 HOFSTRA L. &
POL'Y SYMP. 1, 24-25 (1996).
303. Galie & Pobst, supra note 280, at 41; Williams, supra note 302, at 11.
304. Williams, supra note 302, at 11.
305. Galie & Pobst, supra note 280, at 40, 42-44.
306. Id. at 35-36.
307. Id. at 39 (citing Francis H. Heller, Limiting a State Constitutional Convention: The State
Precedents, 3 CARDOZO L. REv. 575 (1982)).
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little or no support for the view that state constitutional conven-
tions, whether limited or unlimited, constitute a danger to the val-
ues that comprise the American democratic tradition. Most
conventions held in the 20th century are more vulnerable to the crit-
icism that they have been too cautious and unwilling to offer
innovations.30
8
For this reason, voters have been less likely to approve the results of
unlimited conventions. Of the twenty-three unlimited conventions
held between 1938 and 1968, twelve were approved and eleven were
defeated. Of the nine limited conventions held during the period, the
work of eight was approved. °9
Constitutional conventions are subject to the majoritarian pres-
sures that normally dominate the political process and drown out mi-
nority interests. For example, the delegate selection process can allow
wealth to intrude as a factor in political decision-making. This is simi-
lar to normal electoral campaigns, and favors those traditionally bene-
fited by the campaign election process and penalizes those
traditionally disfavored.310
However, before concluding that these mechanisms hold no
promise for setting an economic rights agenda, I demonstrate how
these devices may be strategically combined to achieve this end.
VI. THE ILLINOIS EXPERIENCE
The Illinois Constitution's preamble reads: "[w]e the people, in
order to provide for the health, safety and welfare of our people, elim-
inate poverty and inequality and assure legal, social, and economic
justice."31' This language was incorporated through a concerted effort
by numerous delegates to the 1971 Illinois Constitutional Convention
to include minimum welfare provisions within the Illinois Constitu-
tion. Fortunately there exists a rich documentation of how this lan-
308. Id. at 37-38.
309. Id. at 39 (citing ALBERT STURM, THIRTY YEARS OF STATE CONSTITUTION MAKING
1938-1968 65-66 (1970)).
310. In New York, where voters recently rejected a constitutional convention, voters would
have chosen three delegates from each of the state's sixty-one state senate districts, with an
additional person from each district to be elected as an at-large representative. The ACLU
argued that this simple majority method of delegate selection would dilute the votes of non-
white voters in violation of the Voting Rights Act, and result in a constitutional convention no
different than the Republican-controlled state senate. See Alyssa Katz, Conventional Wisdom,
VILLAGE VOICE, Nov. 4, 1997, at 23.
311. See ILL. CONST. preamble.
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guage found its way into the preamble to the foundational law of that
state.
Illinois is a state where constitutional amendments may be added
by a hybrid process which combines the constitutional initiative, con-
stitutional commission, and the constitutional convention. The Com-
mittee for a Constitutional Convention was a 1960s subcommittee of
the Constitutional Revision Committee of the Chicago Bar Associa-
tion.312 The Committee for a Constitutional Convention was chaired
by Otto Kerner, who convinced the public and the Illinois General
Assembly that a constitutional convention should be put before the
voters in November, 1968. As a direct consequence of the Commit-
tee's educational efforts, 60% of the 4.7 million voters supported a
convention.313 Although a majority of those voting supported a con-
stitutional convention, many organized groups opposed the idea. The
AFL-CIO argued that the convention would result in a regressive con-
stitution, which would weaken the Illinois Bill of Rights. 3 14 Preferring
Illinois' Bill of Rights to a replica of the federal Bill of Rights, the
AFL-CIO warned that the convention would be controlled by busi-
ness interests seeking to control revenue provisions.31 5 Other groups
from the opposite end opposed the convention arguing that it repre-
sented "impending socialism. 316
In December of 1969, the constitutional convention opened in
Springfield, Illinois. One-hundred-sixteen delegates were selected
under rules that required non-partisan selections of two delegates
from each of the fifty-eight state senate districts. Once assembled, the
delegates were divided into committees by the convention president,
Samuel Witwar.317 Pertinent here is the Bill of Rights Committee;
perhaps the most controversial.31 8 Although the Committee was
staffed in 1969, Witwar's Committee was quite diverse, although im-
balanced by gender and occupation. The procedure at the convention
allowed all delegates to introduce "member proposals," which were
312. See ELMER GERTZ & JOSEPH P. PISCIOTTE, CHARTER FOR A NEW AGE: AN INSIDE
VIEW OF THE SIXTH ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 6-12 (1980).
313. Id. at 5-8.
314. See ALAN J. GRATCH & VIRGINIA H. UBIK, BALLOTS FOR CHANGE - NEW SUFFRAGE
AND AMENDING ARTICLES FOR ILLINOIS 7 (1973).
315. Id.
316. GERTZ & PISCIoTTE, supra note 312, at 65.
317. Id. at 24.
318. Id. at 78.
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cleared by the legislative reference bureau for proper phrasing.319
Many of these proposals dealt with issues that members brought to
the convention after discussions with concerned citizens or "pressure
groups.""32 They were then assigned by the convention president to
the appropriate committee, which then prepared majority and minor-
ity reports.321
The Bill of Rights Committee consulted many documents as they
proceeded with their work. One of the key documents was a model
state constitution, published by the National Municipal League.322
This document outlined traditional principles of constitutional draft-
ing, of which almost all conformed to basic American political ideals,
and emphasized simplicity and clarity. 323 Convention members also
received a series of research papers prepared by the constitutional re-
search group.324
Some of these papers explicitly discussed the incorporation of ec-
onomic rights into the constitution. For example, a paper by Paul
Kauper argued that economic and social rights require an analysis of
free enterprise, socialism, and the welfare state. As such, they were
"programmatic" rather than judicially enforceable. Therefore, they
are best addressed by a legislative body, not framers of a constitu-
tion.325 In a separate paper, Frank Grad lamented that despite the
emphasis on economic rights by Roosevelt in his "Four Freedoms"
speech and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, none of the
recent state constitutions, except Puerto Rico, mentions these rights.
Noting that the right "to be free from hunger and want, the right to
medical care and dignified support through old age, the right to ade-
quate food, clothing, and shelter, [and] the right to useful and creative
work" have been recognized since the days of the New Deal, Grad
319. Id. at 45. In addition, proposals were analyzed by Dallin Oaks, committee counsel, and
a staff of University of Chicago law students in memoranda referred to as Legal Research and
Advisors' Memoranda. There were fifty such memoranda totaling approximately 660 pages. Id.
at 57. Committee Counsel Oaks took the position that the memoranda should be considered
confidential records of the committee, a proposal that was severely criticized by the press. Id. at
38.
320. Id. at 45.
321. Id. at 47.
322. ELMER GERTZ, FOR THE FIRST HOURS OF TOMORROW: THE NEW ILLINOIS BILL OF
RIGHTS (Joseph P. Pisciotte ed., 1972).
323. Id.
324. These papers were later published as CON-CON: ISSUES FOR THE ILLINOIS CONSTrru-
TIONAL CONVENTION (hereinafter "CON-CON") (Samuel K. Grove and Victoria Ranney eds.,
1970).
325. See Paul G. Kauper, The State Constitution: Its Nature and Purpose, in id., at 3, 26, 27.
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argued that these rights "will be urged upon all constitution makers in
the future." He saw these rights as being easy to include in constitu-
tions if viewed as "mere[ly] [a] depository of general aspirations and
contemporary pieties," and noted:
If, on the other hand, they view the bill of rights as a meaningful
document in which every guarantee of a right carries with it the
assurance of an effective remedy, then they will first attend to find-
ing the remedy before articulating the right. A guarantee in a state
constitution of adequate food, clothing, shelter, medical care, and
security during old age is meaningless unless provision is made else-
where in the constitution to make good on that guarantee .... If the
integrity of the constitutional document is to be preserved, its guar-
antees must be meaningful and capable of fulfillment. A mere
statement of the guarantee will not accomplish this purpose because
there is no legal or constitutional method by which the legislature
can be compelled to comply with such a constitutional mandate.
Unless a method to fulfill the promise of social and economic rights
is provided, their inclusion in the state constitution will at most pro-
vide a slogan or a rallying point for political action by the disadvan-
taged groups who, instead of new rights, will discover new
disappointment.326
An especially interesting paper was presented to convention dele-
gates outlining different approaches that could be taken to solve ur-
ban problems.327 The first approach discussed was a "brevity and
flexibility" approach, under which the constitution says very little
about specific urban problems. Under this model, the state govern-
ment would possess the authority and responsibility to come up with
solutions for public services, but neither the state powers nor the solu-
tions would be enumerated as specific rights, an approach suggested
by the model state constitution.328
The second approach incorporates specific provisions within the
constitution that relate to particular urban problems or issues. For
example, Article VIII of the Hawaii Constitution mandates assistance
326. See Frank P. Grad, The State Bill of Rights, in CON-CON, supra note 324, at 30, 55-56.
327. See James M. Banovetz, Constitutional Approaches to Urban Society: Empowering Gov-
ernments to Resolve Urban Problems, in CON-CON, supra note 324, at 248. Banovetz adopts a
broad reading of the phrase "urban problems" to include not just the issues that would normally
be encompassed by the phrase, i.e., transportation, air and water pollution, land use planning,
sewage and waste disposal, public safety, park and recreational opportunities and governmental
organization. He also recognizes that the economic and social structure of the cities compels the
addition of other concerns to this list, such as public education, housing, race relations, poverty,




for persons unable to maintain a standard of living compatible with
decency and health; housing for persons of low income as well as slum
clearance and the development or rehabilitation of substandard areas;
treatment, rehabilitation, and domiciliary care for people with disabil-
ities; protection and promotion of the public health; efforts to con-
serve and develop objects and places of historic or cultural interest,
sightliness, and good order, as well as the natural beauty of the
state.32 9
The third approach is the statement of socio-economic goals ar-
ticulated as rights.330 This approach words substantive provisions as
"rights inherent in state citizenship. A listing of social rights would
provide victims of social or economic deprivation with a viable basis
for legal redress through the courts."33 '
As a result of these documents and discussions within the Bill of
Rights Committee, a state protection of basic needs requirement was
approved by the Committee in an 8-7 vote, but failed to get the neces-
sary fifty-nine votes of the entire convention to be incorporated into
the Illinois Constitution. The provision stated "it shall be the public
policy of the state that all persons have adequate nourishment, shelter,
clothing, and medical care and other needs of human life and dig-
nity." '332 One of the main concerns motivating those opposed to the
provision was the argument, noted in the final report of the Commit-
tee, that there were no comparable provisions in any other state
constitution.333
Another defeated proposal was to declare health a basic human
right and created a government responsibility to ensure that all citi-
zens can access quality health care, regardless of ability to pay.334 Ad-
ditional attention was devoted to state responsibilities concerning
education. Illinois' 1870 constitutional provision guaranteed only a
common school education.335 Many education experts, witnesses, and
committee members felt that this inadequately expressed the modern
importance of education. These experts urged that the state should be
constitutionally bound to do more, arguing that the state should pro-
329. Id. at 255-56.
330. Id. at 251.
331. Id. at 261.
332. GERTZ & PisciorE, supra note 312, at 106.
333. Id. at 107.
334. Id.
335. See ILL. CONST. (1870).
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vide a high quality education for all, regardless of race, religion, or
disability.336
The Committee's proposal stated:
The 'paramount' goal of the people of the state shall be the
educational development of all persons to the limits of their capaci-
ties. To achieve this goal it shall be the duty of the state to provide
for an efficient system of high quality public educational institutions
and services. Education in the public schools to the secondary level
shall be free. There may be such other free education as the general
assembly provides.
33 7
A critic of the proposal denounced it as a "concept of educational
responsibility unique in this country," because, by allowing education
of all people to the "limits of their capacities," and providing that "ed-
ucation in the public schools throughout the secondary level shall be
free," the provision provided free education to children and adults.338
This was precisely the intention of members of the Bill of Rights Com-
mittee who supported the proposal that became part of the constitu-
tion.339 However, when the issue came before the Supreme Court of
Illinois, it was held that the language on financing was "merely horta-
tory," and not intended to state a specific command.34 °
What eventually emerged from the Bill of Rights Committee was
a proposed preamble to the Illinois Constitution which read: "We the
people, in order to provide for the health, safety, and welfare of our
people, eliminate poverty and inequality and assure legal, social, and
economic justice."' 341 This language, which was adopted by the con-
vention as a whole, is a specific addition to the language of the pream-
ble that existed since 1870 and now forms the preamble to the Illinois
Constitution. The common understanding is that the language means
that the state government of Illinois is charged with "providing the
opportunity for the fullest development of the individual. 342
336. GERTZ & PiscioaE, supra note 312, at 287.
337. Id. at 290.
338. Id. at 292.
339. Id. at 289.
340. Blase v. State, 302 N.E.2d 46 (Il1. 1973) (construing later amendment to the Constitution
which stated: "The State has the primary duty to finance the system of public educational institu-
tions and services").
341. ILL. CONST. preamble.
342. GERTZ & Piscio-rrE, supra note 312. Gertz himself acknowledges that the language has
also been derided as "not operative but simply hortatory sermons." Id. at 12-13. Moreover, the
document that was most frequently consulted by the members of the Bill of Rights Committee,
an annotated version of the current Illinois constitution, stated that "preambles have never




Of the states that have mandated constitutional provisions for the
protection of economic rights, many require specific legislative action
to trigger these provisions.3 ' Some state constitutions have such lan-
guage in the preamble, which often limits their enforcement in the
courts of the state absent further legislative action. International
agreements providing for economic rights are either unsigned or have
been declared non self-executing, and therefore non-justiciable with-
out explicit congressional action. It is clear that prior to the operation
of these provisions, there must be direct and explicit support from
those political branches of government which are theoretically closest
to the voting electorate. Will the American people use the means I
have discussed to actualize economic rights guarantees such as those
found in numerous international instruments?
Our nation's history provides some clues. On occasion the gen-
eral public has become so engaged by socio-economic issues that
elected officials responded with economic rights guarantees in order
to prevent or forestall overall political crisis. These periods include
Reconstruction (late 1860s), the New Deal (1930s), and the Great So-
ciety (1960s). During each era, change was propelled by recognition
that a developing crisis was at hand, large sectors of the population
were willing to mobilize for economic change, and implementation of
economic reforms would alleviate or mitigate the effects of the crisis.
Will similar crises in the future act as catalysts for the creation of eco-
nomic rights?
Although the expiration of federal welfare mandates under the
Welfare Reform Act will be a crisis for the poor, I believe that other
domestic factors will reinvigorate calls for minimum welfare guaran-
tees.344 These factors will also explain the political dynamics motivat-
tion." See id. at 15-16 (citing GEORGE D. BRADEN & RUBIN G. COHEN, THE ILLINOIS CONSTI-
TUTION, AN ANNOTATED AND COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 1 (1969)).
343. See Helen Hershkoff, Positive Rights and State Constitutions, 112 HARV. L. REv. 1131
(1999).
344. As a direct consequence of the Welfare Reform Act, it is expected that 11 million
American families, including 1.1 million children will drop below the poverty line. Eight million
families with children, including many working families, will lose an average $1,300 in food
stamps. See Martin Walker, Do Gooders Rally to the Plight of the Poor, MANCHESTER GUARD-
IAN WEEKLY, May 4,1997, at 6; Ellen Goodman, The Sins of the Father, MANCHESTER GUARD-
IAN WEEKLY, Mar. 23, 1997, at 20; Andrew C. Revkin, A Plunge in Use of Food Stamps Causes
Concern, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 1999, at Al. An unintended consequence of the Welfare Reform
Act is the loss of Medicaid coverage for hundreds of thousands of low-income people in the
United States because of faulty compliance with the law by state officials. See Robert Pear, Poor
Workers Lose Medicaid Coverage Despite Eligibility, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 1999, at Al.
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ing attacks on the poor such as the new "welfare reform." The chief
factor is the continuing middle class income stagnation in the United
States, a consequence of lagging productivity and overall economic
inequality.345 While the number of the United States poor is by no
means negligible, it is dwarfed by the number of middle and low in-
come families that are finding it increasingly difficult to maintain or
advance their standard of living. Programs tailored to assist these
families should be high on any economic rights agenda and will be
more politically palatable than programs perceived as only benefiting
the poor. A progressive and pragmatic economic rights agenda will
propose programs that benefit those trapped by income stagnation, as
well as the jobless poor.
As in other industrialized nations, living standards in the United
States tend to rise as a consequence of worker output or productivity,
measured by dividing the nation's output by the nation's total hours
worked. When workers produce more, the conditions are ripe for sal-
ary increases. Accordingly, in the last twenty-five years, the standard
of living for the American middle class has not risen significantly, in-
stead staying in line with the meager increases in productivity over the
last quarter century. During the 1970s and 1980s, U.S. productivity
grew at less than half its pace in the 1950s.3 4 6
From the 1947 to 1973 post-war boom, U.S. wages increased
slightly outpaced productivity gains. However, these gains were
eroded from 1973 to 1982 when workers' wages rose at only half the
rate of productivity, and from 1982 to 1994, when workers' wages rose
only one-third as much. Compared to an average annual rate of
growth of 2.25% between 1870 and 1973, labor productivity has risen
at an average rate of only 1% a year since 1973. Throughout the
1990s, it has continued to rise at only 1% a year. This was true even in
1996 when overall economic growth was relatively high. Even in the
private sector, where output per person of all non-farm workers rose
by 25% between 1973 and 1995, real hourly earnings of production
345. See Mark Levinson, Show Me the Money: A Study of Why Americans Are Wary of the
Future Despite the Bull Economy, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 1999, at 19 (reviewing FRANK LEVY, THE
NEW DOLLARS AND DREAMS: AMERICAN INCOMES AND ECONOMIC CHANGE (1999)) (docu-
menting falling incomes of skilled workers, increasing inequality, and lagging worker productiv-
ity); SKOCPOL & GREENBERG, supra note 13, at 1, 7.
346. See Simon Head, The New Ruthless Economy, N.Y. REv. OF BOOKS, Feb. 29, 1996, at
47; Louis Uchitelle, Gains in Employment But Not in Productivity, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 1998, at
1; Deflation Has Two Faces, And One of Them Isn't Pretty, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1998, at 5; Mus-
cleman, Or 98-pound Weakling: Taking the Measure of An 8 Year Expansion, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
18, 1998, at 1, 11.
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and other non-supervisory workers fell by 12%. 3 4 7 Even during the
current economic recovery, wage increases have yet to match produc-
tivity increases, making this the first time in American post-war his-
tory that real wages of most working Americans have failed to
increase significantly during a recovery.348
Stagnating wages have taken a tremendous toll on many middle
income workers. The average weekly earnings of 80% of working
Americans, adjusted for inflation, fell by 18% between 1973 and 1995
(from $315 a week to $258 per week).34 9 This decline has hit young
men seeking to raise families particularly hard. For example, in 1970
an average new house cost twice a couple's income; it now costs four
times their income. New cars cost about half a young couple's in-
come, compared to only 38% in 1970.350 The proportion of men
twenty-five to thirty-four years old earning less than the poverty line
increased from 13.6% in 1969 to 32.2% in 1993.35' The median real
wage for full-time male workers fell from $34,048 in 1973 to $30,407 in
1993. These forces struck African American men particularly hard.352
Bureau of Labor statistics reveal that 36% of African American men
aged sixteen to thirty-four in 1997 were either unemployed, not look-
ing for work, or in prison. Thus is born the stark statistical ratio of
only forty employed African American men for every 100 African
American women.353 Median wages for women did not start to fall
until 1989, but are now falling for every group of women except the
college educated. 4
These indicia of income stagnation and decline are camouflaged
by figures from the U.S. Census Bureau and other sources docu-
menting rising household income, since those figures are based on
family members working longer hours for the same hourly pay.355
347. See Madrick, supra note 23, at 40 (reviewing ANDREW HACKER, MONEY: WHO HAS
How MUCH AND WHY (1997)).
348. Head, supra note 346.
349. Id. at 47.
350. See Madrick, supra note 23, at 40, 41; Holly Sklar, Boom Times for Billionaires, Bust for
Workers and Children, Z MAGAZINE, Nov. 1997, at 32, 33.
351. The "poverty line" for a family of four was defined at cash income less than $16,400 in
1997. For a family of three, the figure is $12,802. See Pear, supra note 344, at Al, A25.
352. See Lester C. Thurow, Companies Merge; Families Break Up, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 1995,
at 11.
353. See Sylvia Nasar, Jobless Rate In U.S. Hits 29 Year Low, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3,1999, at C1,
C3.
354. Head, supra note 346, at 47.
355. See Madrick, supra note 23, at 42.
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Dismayingly, it is not higher wages, but extra time on the job that
accounts for figures suggesting rising household income.356
This slide of middle class incomes has contributed to income ine-
quality in the United States. The top 1% of the population now owns
48% of the nation's financial wealth, while the bottom 80% owns only
6%, 3 5 7 a wealth differential more extreme than it has been in fifty
years. The United States is the most economically unequal country in
the advanced industrialized world.358 What makes this persistent ine-
quality especially disconcerting is that it has occurred concurrent with
increased job growth.359 According to some economists, this inequal-
ity will not be mitigated by job growth or general economic expansion
without a massive infusion of higher paying jobs.36 However, in the
1991-1993 recession, more than 45% of the jobs lost were higher pay-
ing white-collar jobs, double the number in the previous recession.36 '
Paradoxically, adding large numbers of high paying jobs to the
economy can cause ripple effects deemed unfortunate by some econo-
mists. Large increases in the number of jobs lowers unemployment,
but leaves fewer workers to fill needed positions.362 Employers must
then raise wages to attract workers from other jobs, rather than from
356. Id.
357. See Gary Wills, A Tale of Two Cities, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, Oct. 3, 1996, at 16 (citing
EDWARD N. WOLFF, Top HEAVY: THE INCREASING INEQUALITY OF WEALTH IN AMERICA AND
WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT (1996)) (noting that the average CEO makes 225 times the
compensation earned by the employees under him).
358. Madrick, supra note 23, at 40, 41 (arguing that increasing inequality is rooted in struc-
tural characteristics of this economic era, not in deliberate governmental policies, and reflects
the shift to a purer market economy and the erosion of institutions that once offset market
forces); Kevin Sullivan, Cost of Economic Equality Questioned, MANCHESTER GUARDIAN
WEEKLY, June 8, 1997, at 17 (noting remarks of former Labor Secretary Robert Reich that U.S.
is characterized by a "chasm of inequality").
359. In January, 1999, 64.5% of Americans had jobs, the largest percentage since the govern-
ment began compiling employment numbers in 1948. The unemployment rate for January, 1999
was 4.3%, close to the lowest rate in three decades. See Sylvan Nasar, January Gains in Jobs
Doubled Forecast, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 1999, at Cl.
360. John Schwarz asserts that since the 1950s, the U.S. has lacked a sufficient number of
"good jobs," and that the shortfall is increasing despite strong economic growth. According to
Schwarz, the "good job" pays at least $27,000 a year. See Louis Uchitelle, Opportunity Lost,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 1997 at 38 (reviewing JOHN E. SCHWARZ, ILLUSIONS OF OPPORTUNITY:
THE AMERICAN DREAM IN QUESTION (1997)).
361. This is in marked contrast to previous recessions where it was the blue collar, hourly
paid worker who was laid off. See Daniel Bell, The Disunited States of America: Middle Class
Fears Turn Class War Into Culture Wars, TIMES LIT. Supp. (London), June 9, 1995, at 17.
362. According to long-standing assumptions, this begins to happen when unemployment
dips below 5.5% and overall growth in the economy exceeds 2.2%. This has often been referred
to as the "non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment," or NAIRU. See Irwin M. Seltzer,




the smaller pool of the unemployed, who would ostensibly work for
lower wages.363 The increase in the wages employers must pay forces
them to increase prices on the goods they sell in order to retain profit
margins. The increase in prices, coupled with the increase in wage
payments sets off spiraling inflation, eroding the value of currency. To
end the spiral, the Federal Reserve is empowered to take action slow-
ing economic growth, usually through raising interest rates, thereby
making it more expensive for businesses to borrow money.364 Busi-
nesses which cannot borrow money cannot increase production. As
production slows, workers are laid off. If this happens on a large
scale, consumer spending begins to decline and leads to more layoffs
because fewer people are buying goods. As jobs become scarce,
workers are willing to work for less money, goods become cheaper
because there are fewer buyers, and inflation subsides.365
High employment and inflation are anathema to stock market in-
vestors. 366 High employment means higher wages for workers and
lower profits for corporations. Lower profits for corporations means
smaller returns for investors who own corporate stocks.3 67 On the
other hand, bull runs on the stock market tend to encourage consumer
spending (the so-called "wealth effect"), and causes economies to
grow. This spending has the same effect as high employment, leading
to the creation of jobs, a shortage of available workers, wage in-
creases, and elevated prices for employers seeking to maintain profit
margins and inflation. These situations can also lead to intervention
by the Federal Reserve to raise interest rates to slow, or "cool," the
economy.368 These interest rate hikes are designed to slow down eco-
nomic growth and reduce speculation in the stock markets, but they
also cause stock sell-offs as speculators seek to capture profits. These
sell-offs reduce the value of stocks and mutual funds held by millions
363. See Louis Uchitelle, As Asia Stumbles, U.S. Economy Stays in Economic Stride, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 7, 1997, at 40.
364. Robert D. Hershey, Jr., U.S. Jobless Rate Declines to 4.7%, Lowest Since 1973, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 8, 1997, at Al.
365. This is referred to as the "Phillips Curve," marked by a trade off between unemploy-
ment and inflation. See Seltzer, supra note 362, at 10.
366. See Jeff Madrick, The Worker's Just Reward, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 1999, at 15.
367. Jacob Weisberg, United Shareholders of America, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 1998, at 28; John
M. Berry, Jobs Surge Sends Shares into Tailspin, MANCHESTER GUARDIAN WEEKLY, Mar. 17,
1996, at 15.
368. See Seltzer, supra note 362.
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of people, mostly individuals and families planning for retirement.369
Many of these shareholders, the majority of the voting population in
the United States, 370 expect unreasonable returns on their invest-
ments. 371 On the other hand, higher employment accompanied by low
inflation, or even deflation, is good for investors because it often
means lower interest rates and greater sales and profits because work-
ing consumers have increased purchasing power.372
For these reasons, demands for a federally guaranteed right to a
job will surely trigger arguments that such a guarantee will wreak
havoc in financial markets. Moreover, such measures would be
deemed unnecessary when unemployment is at historical lows.
Naysayers notwithstanding, growing inequality of wealth in this soci-
ety and its attendant economic difficulties must soon intrude upon the
nation's conscience and onto the political agenda. I predict that ef-
forts to address issues of inequality will begin at the grassroots level
and branch outward. As discussed, the states provide most of the eco-
nomic rights legislation currently in place. It is here that an expanded
economic rights agenda will find rich soil in which to take root and
grow. The extensive history of local and statewide efforts to protect
those protected by governmental programs cannot be ignored. More-
over, because the nation's issues have their own local texture, a state
approach will respond to local exigencies, whether in health care, jobs,
education, or housing.3 73 Just as the federal government will not take
on the entire International Covenant, neither will any individual state,
as none can bankroll such a program without a massive tax exodus.
369. The Investment Company Institute tracks the flow into and out of mutual funds. At the
close of 1997 it reported $232 billion in new equity mutual fund investments. See Kenneth
Gilpin, Stocks Streak: Eight Rallies in Eight Days, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 1998, at D6.
370. Among registered voters, shareholders outnumber those not in the market 54% to 43%.
See Weisberg, supra note 367, at 28.
371. A survey of 750 fund investors conducted for Montgomery Asset Management found
that shareholders anticipated average annual returns of 34% on their investments over the next
decade. This is three times the average annual return from stocks over the last 60 years. See
Edward Wyatt, The High Hopes of Investors in Stock Funds, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 1997, at D1;
Weisberg, supra note 367, at 28-30.
372. See Jonathan Fuerbringer, Stocks Rally On Strength of Jobs Data, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5,
1998, at Cl.
373. Cf. Alston, supra note 219, at 379 (the "starting point for a program to implement eco-
nomic and social rights is to ascertain, as precisely as possible, the nature of the existing situation
with respect to each fight, so as to identify more clearly the problems that need to be addressed
and provide a basis for principled policy making"). As this article goes to press, Illinois voters
may soon vote on an amendment to the Illinois Constitution known as the Bernardin Amend-
ment, which asks "shall the Illinois General Assembly ... establish health care as a basic right of
every person in our State?" See Linda Lutton, A Healthy Chance, IN THESE TIMES, May 2, 1999,
at 9; K.P., Universal Health Care Win, IN THESE TIMES, May 16, 1999, at 5.
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What will be the role of the International Covenant and its
source, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, in this evolution-
ary process? I surmise that it will be primarily aspirational; serving as
yet another tool for those at the forefront of movements for economic
rights at the local level. The more experience gained fighting for eco-
nomic rights in the state and local arenas, the greater the realization
that economic rights guarantees require national, if not international
solutions. This ought to urge the United States towards the many in-
ternational agreements which provide economic rights guarantees.
VIII. CONCLUSION
I began this article asserting that the political and civil rights
guaranteed by the United States Constitution exist only as a result of
tremendous political struggles. This is not enough. Still to be
achieved is a system to protect the population from both the periodic
and the structural realities of economic life in a capitalist market econ-
omy. This is so even in what may appear to be the best of times. We
need an international approach that borrows from the outstanding
work of the last half-century. We must heed those who articulate in-
ternational minimum economic guarantees as well as other structures
that allow nation-states to incorporate such rights into their respective
systems. Most importantly, we must look locally and build upon the
edifice of the American state constitutional structure, which is already
firmly and promisingly in place.
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